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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Information Theoretic Methods for Biometrics, Clustering, and Stemmatology
by
Po-Hsiang Lai
Doctor of Science in Information Theory
Washington University in St. Louis, 2012
Research Advisor: Professor O’Sullivan

This thesis consists of four parts, three of which study issues related to theories and applications of
biometric systems, and one which focuses on clustering.
We establish an information theoretic framework and the fundamental trade-off between utility of
biometric systems and security of biometric systems. The utility includes person identification and
secret binding, while template protection, privacy, and secrecy leakage are security issues addressed.
A general model of biometric systems is proposed, in which secret binding and the use of passwords
are incorporated. The system model captures major biometric system designs including biometric
cryptosystems, cancelable biometrics, secret binding and secret generating systems, and salt biometric systems. In addition to attacks at the database, information leakage from communication links
between sensor modules and databases is considered. A general information theoretic rate outer
bound is derived for characterizing and comparing the fundamental capacity, and security risks and
benefits of different system designs.
We establish connections between linear codes to biometric systems, so that one can directly use
a vast literature of coding theories of various noise and source random processes to achieve good
performance in biometric systems.
We develop two biometrics based on laser Doppler vibrometry (LDV) signals and electrocardiogram
(ECG) signals. For both cases, changes in statistics of biometric traits of the same individual is the
major challenge which obstructs many methods from producing satisfactory results. We propose a
ii

robust feature selection method that specifically accounts for changes in statistics. The method yields
the best results both in LDV and ECG biometrics in terms of equal error rates in authentication
scenarios.
Finally, we address a different kind of learning problem from data called clustering. Instead of having
a set of training data with true labels known as in identification problems, we study the problem of
grouping data points without labels given, and its application to computational stemmatology. Since
the problem itself has no “true” answer, the problem is in general ill-posed unless some regularization
or norm is set to define the quality of a partition. We propose the use of minimum description length
(MDL) principle for graphical based clustering. In the MDL framework, each data partitioning is
viewed as a description of the data points, and the description that minimizes the total amount of
bits to describe the data points and the model itself is considered the best model. We show that
in synthesized data the MDL clustering works well and fits natural intuition of how data should be
clustered. Furthermore, we developed a computational stemmatology method based on MDL, which
achieves the best performance level in a large dataset.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
This dissertation consists of two themes. One theme concerns the theories and designs of identification systems and security issues around such systems, with a major application focus on biometrics.
Template security and robustness against changes in data statistics are two unique challenges in
biometric identification systems. The other theme is on the problem of automatically partitioning objects or data points, and the application is on reconstructing relations among ancient text
documents, known as computational stemmatology. Two key challenges in computational stemmatology are missing text documents which are not discovered by historians, and damages in available
documents such as missing or broken pages.
In this introduction, I outline the key concepts and problems involved in each theme, as well as
the contributions in each chapter. On the other hand, there are a number of interesting real life
situations that are in fact closely related to the problems studied in this dissertation. By presenting
a small selection of them here, one may find it more inspiring or motivating to appreciate the results,
even though one has other topics of interest.

1.1

Identification in Real Life and Biometrics

One important goal of biometrics is to recognize humans based on physical and behavioral characteristics. Classical biometrics includes fingerprint, face, voice, and iris. In most cases, the problem
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of interest is either “who is this person?” or “Is this person genuine or an impostor?”. Both cases
are under the category of supervised learning problems.
Supervised learning is a major form of inference and a major research area across many fields from
engineering, statistics, to neuroscience. Identification, recognition, classification, and hypothesis
testing are examples of supervised learning. The abstract problem goes like the following. A supervised learning problem consists of two stages, the training phase and the testing phase. In the
training phase, a learner, a machine or a living organism, is given a set of training data points, i.e.
examples, (xi , yi ), where xi denotes the observation of the ith data point, and yi is the true class
label taking values from a discrete set, i.e. the names of different classes, provided by a supervisor
or reliable past experiences. The index i goes from 1 to n where n is the number of training data.
In the testing phase, the learner obtains new testing data points xt associated with an unobserved
label yt where the relation, characterized by the joint distribution p(x, y) is assumed to be the same
as the examples. The task of the learner is to make a prediction ŷt about the unobserved label.
The learner makes an error if ŷt 6= yt . A special case of identification problem is when the labels
take only two values, such as “yes” and “no”, or “accept” and “reject”. This is called verification
in biometrics or binary hypothesis testing in statistics.
There are abundant identification problems in life. In biometrics, the xi may be a fingerprint image,
a face image, a voice recording, or a heartbeat signal, and yi is the identity or name of the person, or
an indicator for whether this person is genuine or an impostor. Also, in the problem of recognizing
words written in a document, the xi here is the image perceived in one’s eyes and yi is the actual
word. In identifying a speaker’s voice, xi is sound waves received by the ears, and yi is the name
of the speaker. In spam email filtering, xi is the content, the timing, the sender, and the receivers
of the email and yi is “spam” and “not spam.” In suggesting products to consumers, xi may be the
shopping behavior, living style and so on, and yi is the product that the person may purchase.
In most machine learning systems or the brain, the xi is processed and transformed into another
domain. The transformed data in this domain is denoted as fi , where the decision is taken place. The
goals are to extract and select relevant and reliable information and to remove redundancy such that
decisions can be made with higher accuracy or efficiency. Then a decision mechanism operates on
fi to predict yi . In fingerprint recognition, the features may be the ending or bifurcation locations
2

of ridges. For visual object recognition, there are neurons called simple cells in the early visual
cortex that react to specific simple patterns such as ring patterns with red inside and green outside
at specific locations of the visual field. The information is then forwarded to higher level neurons
which react to highly complex patterns such as faces. Such biologically motivated features can be
used in face recognition systems. In real life identification problem such as choosing a relationship,
the features may be a list of personal characteristics, behaviors, locations and so on. The performance
of an identification system depends on both good feature extraction and selection, and the decision
mechanism based on the features.

1.1.1

Evaluating Quality of Data and Learners

There is a value, or cost, associated with each correct inference and error made by the learner. Some
error leads to much higher loss than others. For example, misrecognizing a puma as a cat may
be disastrous, while misrecognizing a cat as a puma leads to less harm. In biometrics, letting an
impostor get into an important facility usually bears a higher cost relative to rejecting and further
questioning a genuine user. On the other hand, there is also a probability associated with each
event the learner should also consider. Certain facilities are less targeted by attackers than others
and so overly complicated screening procedures in fact are not necessarily justifiable. The goal of
a learner is to maximize the total expected value, or minimize the expected cost. The expectation
is taken over the underlying distribution of events weighted by the associated value and cost, while
this distribution is in general not available. The evaluation of a learner is usually done by testing
the learner on an unseen dataset with the same or similar properties as the training dataset.
In verification or binary hypothesis testing cases, if the learner rejects a data point that it should
accept, it is called a false reject error, false non-match, false positive, or type I error. On the other
hand, if the learner accepts a data point that it should reject, it is called a false accept error, false
match, false negative, or type II error. The trade-off between these two types of error is critical to
system design.
It is critical to understand the fundamental properties of the identification problem, from the data
to the operational requirements and constraints before evaluation of a learner. In many problems,
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the performance of a learner is said to be good in a relative sense, comparing to fundamental
performance limits posed by the problem and the data. However, in problems such as biometrics,
a specified level of performance must be met. Thus the data itself must allow the possibility of a
good learner achieving the desired performance. It is often impossible to have any learner perform
properly for a given set of data. For example, height measured at the accuracy of a centimeter may
not be applicable to distinguish several thousands of individuals. Hence height alone is not a good
biometric. In the following, I list four critical properties that an identification problem should have
for a learner achieving a specified performance level to exist. In addition to these four properties, a
biometric trait also needs to be universal in that every individual should have it.

1 Uniqueness of each label class given the measurements A good biometric trait must
lead to data that distinguishes one individual from another with high probability. There are
some problems in which the data is fundamentally impossible for any learner to achieve a
desired performance because some classes are indistinguishable with high probability.
2 Stability or manageable changes In order for a learner to perform well, the statistical
properties of data from one measurement occasion to another must stay the same, or change
in a manageable manner. For example, the face of an individual changes across ages, while the
changes are small in a short time frame and updates of new images are not required frequently.
On the other hand, some changes are more rapid and harder to update constantly. The later
case is discussed more in the next section and Chapter 3.
3 Measurability and acceptability The data must be measurable within the available resources and external constraints of the learner. For example, a DNA sequence is very unique
and stable, but it is not measurable in a short enough period of time for access control of an
entrance point or an ATM machine. In daily applications, the use of DNA for identification
is also not acceptable to most individuals, because it has aspects of invasion and leakage of
privacy.
4 Circumvention The data properties of different labels have to be hard to fake or mimic for
an impostor. Artificial fingerprints or mimicking someone else’s voice are attacks that threaten
the security and usability of some biometrics.
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It is worth noting that except measurability and acceptability, the other three properties are essential
for selected features also. However, one should not confuse the requirements of a set of selected
features as the requirements of a single feature. For example, height alone may not be enough to
identify the gender of an individual, while combining height with other body measurements, which
separately are also insufficient, can lead to high accuracy of gender identification.
In addition, there are three other aspects that are important to biometric systems.

• Template security The data stored in a biometric system must be protected. Unlike the
classical encryption of a password, the biometric trait of an individual is hard to replace. Thus
the data security, or more specifically template security, in biometrics focuses on the condition
that if the database is compromised, there must be only a limited amount of information leaked.
The information leakage may due to a database being compromised, or a communication link
between the sensor and database being compromised.
• Passwords Passwords are another popular way for access control and identifying individual.
It may be considered as a sequence of symbols to remember, or a physical object such as an
identification card. Passwords can easily be chosen to be unique, easy to measure, and generally
acceptable, while they are easier to steal or copy. One important question is what additional
benefits a biometrics-password joint system provides over password systems or biometrics
systems alone.
• Secret embedding In some systems, there are secrets embedded in biometric signals such
that only the genuine user should be able to retrieve them. The biometric signals can be used as
an enveloped signal to protect information about the secrets being leaked, as in watermarking
systems. On the other hand, the secret signal can also be used to protect information about the
biometric traits being leaked. Two important questions regarding secrets in biometric systems
are how many different secrets can be embedded in a biometric trait and what benefits such
as information leakage protection the secrets can provide to a biometric system.
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1.2

Learning the Genuine Hearts: Biometrics Based on Cardiac Signals

In the past 10 years, the idea of establishing biometrics based on signals related to heartbeats has
been studied. The signals are obtained using a laser Doppler vibrometor (LDV) remotely measuring
skin vibrations at the neck due to arterial movements associated with each pulse, or obtained by
attaching electrodes onto the skin measuring electrical changes of the skin due to heart muscle
depolarization, known as electrocardiography (ECG). One benefit of such measurements based on
heartbeats is that it is difficult to mimic, preventing impostors from breaking into the system.
In earlier studies, it has been shown that both LDV and ECG signals are unique when training data
and testing data are obtained consecutively on the same day. However, when the testing data is
obtained on another day, from weeks to months after collecting the training data, huge degradation in
performance of learning algorithms is observed. A closer examination of the LDV cases suggests that
the statistical properties of the impostors are the same, while statistical properties of the genuine
cases change from session to session. The performance degradation is thus driven by an increase in
the false reject rate.
The underlying mechanism is that for the same genuine individual, the cardiovascular outputs change
from day to day, due to physical, psychological, and other factors. The changes are rapid and drastic
as compared to face changes due to aging processes. The major challenge is then to overcome the
changes in statistical properties of the genuine cases, under constraints on the cost of data collection.

1.3

Outlines and Contributions in the Identification Theme

In chapter 2, a general information theoretic framework of biometric systems is proposed. The
framework covers major categories of biometric system designs in the literature, including the use of
passwords along with biometric traits, and secrets embedded in biometric signals. An information
theoretic outer bound is provided to characterize fundamental trade-offs between system utilities
such as identification performance and secret capacity, and system constraints on the amount of
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information allowed to be stored and communicated. This is the first work taking into account both
database and communication leakage in biometric systems with both secrets and passwords involved.
Existing literature concerns mostly only the database leakage, or in cases where communication
leakage is also considered, secrets and passwords are not considered.
The contribution of chapter 3 is to provide links between biometric system designs to error correcting
code designs and source coding. The theoretical performances of biometric system designs for two
scenarios using linear codes are evaluated. One scenario consists of constraints on the number of
bits allowed in the database and through the communication channel. The second scenario concerns
constraints on information leakage about the biometric template and secrets from the database. In
the second scenario, the proposed system design is proved to approach theoretical performance limits
in many general statistical models of biometrics.
In chapter 4, robust feature selection concepts and methods are introduced for LDV and ECG
biometrics to cope with changes in statistics of a biometric trait of the same individual across
sessions. The methods use data from only two training sessions to largely reduce the equal error
rates, leading to the best performance in the literature as of 2012 for for both LDV and ECG based
biometrics.

1.4

Clustering and Computational Stemmatology

In the second theme, the problem of partitioning unlabeled data points is considered. Clustering
is a type of unsupervised learning problem, where there are no true underlying labels available.
The goal of the learner is to partition the data into a set of groups, or a hierarchy which “makes
sense”. It is not a well defined problem unless a measure of “makes sense” of a clustering is defined.
However the goodness of such measures still has to match human intuitions, or the true labels on
some supervised learning problems. In many clustering approaches, the measure of goodness of a
clustering is defined only if the number of resulting clusters is specified. The critical question is how
to compare results across different number of clusters, or results of a different data hierarchies.
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Stemmatology is the study of reconstructing the relationship and transmission of different text
variants of an original document. Throughout the copying process from one variant to the other,
differences among parent documents, the ones being copied, and their children documents are introduced by copying error or deliberate changes. The true copying process is not available in most cases
as it spans hundreds of years without reliable records. In many cases, the underlying unobservable
true copying process is nearly a tree, meaning that if one connects every pair of parent and child
variants, the resulting graph will be connected without cycles. A cycle exists when contamination
occurs where a copier refers to two or more parent variants to generate the new variant. Thus, the
problem of stemmatology is closely related to finding a hierarchical structure among data points,
with two additional challenges:

• Some text variants are never recovered.
• In available text variants, there are missing parts in the variants due to physical damage.
The first challenge occurs also in phylogenetics. Phylogenetics is the study of reconstructing the
evolution tree among species, where some species are not discovered due to extinction or rarity.
Attempts to use methods in phylogenetics yield good performances in smaller datasets of stemmatology problems in which there are fewer missing parts in variants. However in a large dataset with
a large number of missing parts in variants, the performances of most methods are degraded.
The minimum description length (MDL) principle is an information theoretic method for selecting
models for available data in absence of the “true” model. The idea of the MDL principle is to choose
the model which describes the data and the model itself using the least number of bits. In other
words, the model should capture the regularity of the data, hence a short data description length,
and yet still be simple enough, hence a short description length of the model itself. Albert Einstein
had articulated a similar concept:

“It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible
basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate
representation of a single datum of experience.”
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In Chapter 5, we apply the MDL principle to clustering and computational stemmatology. The
idea is to view the problem of finding a cluster or a hierarchy of data points as finding efficient
descriptions of data points. The resulting algorithm performs the best on a large stemmatology
dataset as of 2011.
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Chapter 2

An Information Theoretic Rate
Outer Bound for Identification,
Secrets, and Passwords in
Biometric Systems

2.1

Introduction

In recent years, advanced results have led to an increasing use of biometric systems for personal
identification, authentication and other security applications such as secret binding. There are three
research areas emerging from this trend: biometric template security and privacy, secret binding and
secret generating using biometrics, and joint systems biometrics with passwords. Template security
and privacy are unique challenges resulting from the use of biometric systems that biometric traits are
hard to be replaced or canceled once information about biometric traits is stolen or compromised by
attacks [39], different from classical information security in communication systems where keys and
passwords can be replaced. The key goal of template security and privacy protection in biometric
systems is to prevent attackers from obtaining information about the biometrics from databases
or communication links between the sensors and databases for unauthorized activities. In secret
binding biometric systems, one is also concerned about information leakage of the secret [62].
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There are two major categories of biometric system designs addressing different template and secret
security approaches versus system performance: biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics
[39, 62]. Biometric cryptosystems can be further divided into secret binding and secret generating
systems, and cancelable biometrics can be divided into noninvertable systems and salting [39, 62]. In
all cases, instead of storing the original biometric templates, helper data is stored in the system. The
idea is that the helper data should contain a limited amount of information or be computationally
intense to invert so that inferring the original templates are impossible or hard.
In secret binding biometric cryptosystems, the secret is generated independently of the biometrics.
Both the secrets and the biometrics are used to generate the helper data. In secret generating cases,
the secret is generated directly from the biometrics. For both cases, regeneration of the secret based
on the query data and helper data is a major goal of such systems. The regenerated secret can be
used as a way of secret based identification where the secret matching is done in an encrypted domain,
and a list of encrypted keys has to be stored in the database also. Template protection is realized
through not storing full template information but enough for secret regeneration in helper data
[40, 39, 62]. In other cases, biometric cryptosystems offer an alternative way of steganography [25].
On the other hand, the ideas of cancelable biometrics specifically focus on template protection so
that biometric templates are intentionally stored with distortion in the database such that inversion
is not possible. Thus, the matching must be performed on the distorted domain.
Intuitively, to protect template and privacy, the amount of biometric related information stored and
transmitted in the system should be small. However on the other hand, biometric system possessing
more reliable identification of large number of users and larger secret capability shall require more
biometric relation information. It is then a fundamental question to ask, what the tradeoffs between
the security of the biometric system itself versus the security and utility provided by the biometric
system are.
Recently, fundamental properties of biometric cryptosystems have been studied by Ignatenko and
Willems [35] using information theoretic approaches. In their framework, biometric templates are
used for secret binding or secret generating. A fundamental information theoretic relation among
secret capacity, and information leakage about the biometric templates and secrets from the database
are studied, while the use of passwords is also studied [35]. Furthermore in [36], a fundamental trade
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off between identification capacity, secret capacity versus information leakage from the database
is characterized. Meanwhile, fundamental information theoretic results on the trade off between
recognition capacity and the amount of information allowed to be stored in and communicated
across a recognition system has been studied extensively [86, 72, 81]. A biometric system is a
specialized recognition system so these results can be interpreted as fundamental results on the
trade off between biometric identification capacity and the amount of information about a biometric
template that must be stored, which is also the template and privacy information that could be
leaked if the system was compromised. Others have considered the cases where side information is
available to the attacker in biometric cryptosystems [47]. Table 2.1 summarizes existing information
theoretic results on biometric systems under different assumptions on locations of attack, utility,
and additional information.
On the other hand, encryption is used in biometric cryptosystems, but not all cancellable biometric
systems. Thus, by specifying information theoretic secured components of a system, one can then
ask what is achievable under information theoretic security only, and what additional capacity and
utility can be obtained by allowing additional components that are only cryptographically secure.
An important fundamental question is what are the benefits or drawbacks provided by biometric
cryptosystems in which identification is based on a key-matching process. In other words, the
question one can ask is, under a given set of information theoretic security constraints, how many
users can be registered to infer identity directly versus how many keys can be inferred for matching
in an encrypt domain. If one can infer more keys than direct inference of user identities, this implies
that the use of a hybrid system of information theoretic security and cryptographic security leads
to system with larger biometric capacity.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we introduce major biometric system architectures
and security issues in the literature that are considered in this paper, and information theoretic
security for biometrics. Next, a formal problem definition and a general model is given in section
2.3. The main results is presented in section 2.4 and related to existing literatures. Conceptual
interpretation of the results and the implication on practical methods and novel system designs are
also discussed. Finally, the chapter is concluded in 2.5, and the proof is given in the Section 2.6.
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Table 2.1: Information Theoretic Study on different considerations of biometric systems
Leakage sources
Utility
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Figure 2.1: Basic biometric systems

2.2

Security and Utility of Biometric Systems

In this section, we introduce major architectures of biometric systems, and information theoretic
concepts for measuring security of a biometric system. Consider the basic diagram shown in figure
2.1. For each individual registered in a biometric system, the biometric trait is obtained and processed to store in the database. Here the term process is general, covering processes such as filtering,
feature selection, encryption ect.; and the stored data of an individual may be multiple data files
while here we first group all together and call it as the data associated with an individual. More
detailed models will be discussed later. The sensor is then evoked again to obtain a query data
for one of the two identity control modes: authentication or identification. In the authentication
mode, the sensor also obtained an input of claimed identity, and the goal is to decide if the sensed
data is indeed coming from the claimed individual, e.g. is the data obtained from Alice? In the
identification mode, the goal is to decide to whom the data belongs. Upon deciding the identity
is genuine, the user or the operator is then allowed to proceed with legitimate activities, such as
entering a place, accessing and operating a system, and so on.
Besides serving as an identity control front end, there are also designs of biometric systems that
a secret is associated with each user. Such biometric systems are called biometric cryptosystems.
The data stored in the database may be a function of both the biometric template and the secret
in chosen secret, also known as chosen key, cases. In secret binding, the stored data is a function
only of the biometric template. In both settings, the stored data is related to identity control and
secret retrieval. When a query data comes in, the goal is either to perform identity control and key
retrieval simultaneously, or key retrieval only where identification is based on key matching [62].
There are multiple parts and operational processes in a biometric system that are subjected to
attack; for a comprehensive review see Jain, Nandakumar, and Nagar [39]. In particular, leakage
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Figure 2.2: Key-Binding System: Information Hiding
of information about the template and secrecy are of primary concern in this work. Template
leakage may occur when an attacker successfully enters the database, or an attacker eavesdrops
the communication link between different modules, such as between the sensor and the database,
[41, 42, 80, 1, 39]. There are two major categories of approaches for template and secret protection,
namely biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics.

2.2.1

Template and Secret Protection in Biometric Systems

In biometric cryptosystems, a helper data is stored in the database instead of the original template.
There are two subcategories, secret binding systems and secret generating systems. In secret binding
system, a key S is chosen for each individual, independently from biometric templates. The helper
data H is then a function of the template X and the secret, denoted as H = f (X, S). When a query
data Y comes in, the system regenerates the secret S, or the individual identity, or both. Generally
ˆ = φ(H, Y )
we can denote the identity control and secret regeneration process as a function (Ŝ, J)
shown in Figure 2.2. There are two applications of using secret in secret binding systems. One way
is to use the secrets as a way for information hiding with access control through direct inference of
identity using helper data and the query, as shown in 2.2. The other way is secret based identity
control, as shown in Figure 2.3. In secret based identity control, secrets are encrypted and stored as
a lookup list in the database, and the identity control is done by matching the lookup list encryption
value of recovered secret from helper data and the query. Encryption and thus cryptographic security
and computational hardness of inverting keys from the database is involved.
In generating secret systems, each helper data is a function of the corresponding biometric templates
of an individual, that the secret and helper data are both functions of the template (H, S) = f (X).
As in secret binding system, regeneration of secrets and identity control can be done jointly as in
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Figure 2.3: Key-Binding System: Key Based Identity Control

Figure 2.4: Key-Generating System
Figure 2.4 or use the regenerated secret for matching 2.5 with encrypted version of keys stored in
the database. One application beyond identity control of secret generating biometric system is in
cryptography, where generating identical secret based on the same biometric owner can be use as a
way for key distribution.
Cancelable biometric systems can also be divided into two subcategories, noninvertable systems and
salting. In noninvertable systems, shown in Figure 2.6, templates are transformed by a noninvertable
function, regardless computing power, and the results are stored in the database that identification
is done using the query and stored data, usually in the same transformed domain. Such systems are
required to prevent template recovery by attackers even if the database and transform parameters
are compromised.
Biometric salting, on the other hand, refers to systems using transform functions that are invertible
information theoretically, but computationally hard. Template security is approached by choosing
different transform parameters K for each template to generate helper data H = f (X, K). Such
parameters may be referred to as passwords, secret tokens, or private keys. The parameters have
to be presented in the query alone with sensed biometrics that the inference is denoted as J =
φ(H, Y, K).
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Figure 2.5: Key-Generating System

Figure 2.6: Cancelable biometric

2.2.2

Cryptographic Security and Information Theoretic Security

As in secret key based identity control and cancelable biometric, part of security requires a notion
of computational hardness, i.e. Cryptographic security, of inverting or computing certain functions.
Cryptographic security focuses on infeasibility for the attacker to compute variables of interest. In
contrast to cryptographic security, information theoretic security does not assume the computation
system or computing limits of the attacker. Information theoretic security depends on the intrinsic
randomness existing in the system.
In information theoretic security, mutual information is a common way to measure leakage in biometric systems [36, 47] and communication [53, 22]. For two random variables X and Y , the
information leakage about X from Y and vise versa is captured by the mutual information between
them as I(X; Y ) = H(X) − H(X|Y ). The term H(X|Y ) itself can be used as leakage too and called
information equivocation in that context [53].

2.2.3

Biometrics and Information Theoretic Security

In the above mentioned four major categories of biometric systems, the major security concern
is information leakage of biometric template information or secret. The leakage may result from
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compromised database or communication link. This implies that the mutual information between
the stored data, or processed query data, and the templates must be bound by a tolerated leakage
level.
However, note that in a key based identification system, storing an encrypted version of each key is
necessary, while encryption is not information theoretically secure. In fact, encrypted keys contain
full information about the keys as long as the encryption function is reversible with unconstrained
computational resource.
In this paper, we focus on information theoretic security, but not cryptographic modules in the systems. Note that above mentioned system architectures with encryption of secrets are not excluded.
Secret recovery of such systems is prior to secret matching in encryption domain, in which the accuracy of the systems is bound by recovery accuracy, which can be studied by considering information
theoretically secured modules along, assuming encryption function with low collision probability.
Table 2.1 summarizes fundamental results on capacity of biometric systems have been studied in the
literature, as well as the contribution of this paper. Six key considerations are listed in the table:
leakage of information from database, leakage of information from communication link, identity
control, secret recovery, use of password, and side information. In most of the existing literature, up
to four elements are considered. For example, in the work of [35], leakage from database, password,
secret, and secret recovery are considered. In this paper, all six elements will be considered while
deriving fundamental capacity of biometric systems.

2.3

Formal Problem Definition

In this section, we describe a general model which encompass identification, secret key binding, and
private key in biometric systems, and the information theoretic framework for studying biometric
system security and utility. A biometric system and its operational environment consists of ten
parts: the set of subject indices, the distribution of indices, a biometric source, the source alphabet,
a secret source, a secret set, a password source, a password set, a observation channel, and the
observation alphabet.
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Figure 2.7: The information theoretic privacy protection framework for biometric systems
• The subject index, denoted as j takes value from the set J = {1, · · · , MJ }. The distribution
of indices is pj , j ∈ J , and in this paper, it is assumed to be uniform.
• The biometric source is modeled as a random process of a collection of distributions pxn over a
source alphabet xi ∈ X for all i. For each individual j to be enrolled, the corresponding biometric template is modeled as a length n realization vector xn (j) of the biometric source random
process. The templates of individuals are assumed to be independent, and are independent of
the subject index j, and password k(j).
• The secret source is modeled as an uniform probability mass function P (S) over the set of
secrets S. For each individual j, the corresponding secret s(j) is independent of the index j,
the template xn (j), and the private key k(j).
• The password source is modeled as an uniform probability mass function P (K) over the set of
private keys K. For each individual j, the corresponding password k(j) is independent of the
index j, the template xn (j), and the secret s(j).
• The query observation y n is modeled as passing the templates xn through a noisy channel
with a sequence of conditional distributions pny |xn , whose output takes value in an observation
alphabet Y, independent of the index j, the secret S(j), and the private key K(j).
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2.3.1

System Operation Overview

The biometric system is to identify Mc individuals. During enrollment, Mc templates are drawn i.i.d.
from the biometric source px and presented to the biometric system. For each individual, a secret
key S(j) and a private key K(j) are drawn from the probability mass functions P (S) and P (K),
independent of everything else. The system encoder takes each template with the secret key and the
private key and outputs an encoded data, a.k.a. the helper data, and stores only the helper data but
not the templates, secret keys, nor the private keys. During identification, an index j is drawn from
pj , and a noisy observation y of the corresponding template x(j) is drawn based on the observation
channel py|x and presented to the system with the corresponding private key k(j). The biometric
system encodes the observed y along with k(j). The identification algorithm, i.e. the decoder, uses
the encoded sensor data, along with all the helper data and all private keys for identification and
ˆ
outputs an estimated identity ĵ and an estimated secret S(j).
Note that the private keys K are
assumed to be secure and available to both the enrollment encoder and the sensory encoder, as well
as the identification algorithm.

2.3.2

Encoding and Decoding

For enrollment, the helper data of an individual j is generated based on template x(j), secret key
s(j), and private key k(j). The helper data is denoted as t1 (j) taking values from a set T1 . t(j) is
the output of a template encoder f :

f (x(j), s(j), k(j); px,y , pj , P (S), P (K)) :
X n × S × K → T1 .

(2.1)

The notation means that the encoder may use all the distributions to encode a template, but not
the realizations of other templates, secrets, private keys, nor the observation y. This assumption
is made in most information theoretic studies of biometric systems [86, 81, 35, 47]. The set of all
encoded data is denoted as T1 = {t(1), · · · , t(Mc )}.
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Similarly, for observation encoding, the encoded data is denoted as t2 taking values from a set T2 .
It is the output of an observation encoder g:

g(y, k(j); px,y , pj , P (S), P (K)) :
Y n × K → T2 .

(2.2)

The observation encoder uses the observed y and k(j) and all distributions, but not the realizations
of x.
The identification algorithm is a function φ:

φ(t2 , T1 , K; px,y , pj , P (S), P (K)) :
T2 × T1Mc × KMc → (J , S).

(2.3)

The identification algorithm uses the realizations of all helper data, the password observed at the
sensor, and the distributions, but not the realizations of the templates nor the observation. It
outputs the estimate of the identity ĵ and the associates secret s(ˆĵ).

2.3.3

Definition of Achievability

A rate tuple (RM , L1 , L2 , RS , RK ) is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of encoder and
decoder triples (fn , gn , φn ) such that for any δ > 0 and n large enough:


ˆ 6= (j, S(j))
P r (ĵ, S(j))

≤ δ

n−1 I(S(j); T1 (j))

≤ δ

∀j

n−1 I(S(j); T2 (j))

≤ δ

∀j

n−1 I(X(j); T1 (j))

≤ L1

∀j

n−1 I(Y (j); T2 (j))

≤ L2

∀j

n−1 log |J |

≥ RM

n−1 log |S|

≥ RS

n−1 log |K|

≤ RK .
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The set of all achievable rate tuples is defined as the achievable rate region, denoted as R.

2.4

Main Results and Discussion

The main result is summarized in the following converse theorem.


R ⊆ Rout = RS + RM − RK

≤ I(X ; U ) + I(Y ; V ) − I(X , Y , ; U , V )

L1 + RK − RM

≥

−I(Y ; V ) + I(X , Y ; U , V )

L2 + RK − RM

≥

−I(X ; U ) + I(X , Y ; U , V )

where U and V are auxiliary random variables:

U n = (X n−1 , T1 , S, K)
V n = (Y n−1 , T2 , K),
satisfying the Markov conditions U n − X n − Y n and X n − Y n − V n ,
I(X ; Y ) = H(X ) + H(Y ) − H(X , Y ),

(2.4)

and H(X ) denotes the entropy rate of the random process X.

2.4.1

Special Cases

The outer bound presented in this paper is tight in the sense that the outer bounds or exact achievable
rate region in many special cases published in the literature can be directly derived from it.
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Zero Privacy leakage and passwords

The theorem states that

L1 + RK − RM ≥ −I(Y ; V ) + I(X , Y ; U , V ),

(2.5)

where the right hand side is nonnegative. Thus it is impossible to avoid potential privacy leakage in
direct identification biometric systems using a biometric trait alone. Even in secret based identification systems, one has to assume that the lookup list of encrypted secrets will not be compromised,
which is theoretically and practically difficult to validate. However, with the use of a password along
with a biometric, one can develop zero privacy leakage and zero secrecy leakage systems.

Recognition with constraints

There are a number of results on information theoretic biometrics or recognition, where the focus
is solely on direct identification, or recognition, without secrets or passwords. The constraints are
focused on the amount of information allowed to be leaked, or allowed to be stored. Note that these
two constraints are closely related but different. The former is measured by mutual information,
the latter is measured by bits per stored helper data. Early studies yield fundamental insights on
systems whose database is constrained, while the sensory capacity and communication link are not
[71]. More comprehensive results on recognition with both database and sensing, or communication,
constrains were obtained by Westover and O’Sullivan [86]. The constraints are

log T1

≤ R1

(2.6)

log T2

≤ R2 .

(2.7)

The achievable rate region Rwot is defined as the set of all achievable rate tuples (R1 , R2 , RM ) such
that for any ǫ > 0 and n sufficiently large, there exist (f, g, φ) such that

Pr(ŵ 6= w)

≤ ǫ

n−1 log |T1 |

≤ R1
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n−1 log |T2 |

≤ R2

n−1 log |Mc |

≥ Rc .

The outer bound Rrec
out [86, 81], rewritten with some algebra, is

Rrec
out = RM

≤ I(X ; U ) + I(Y ; V ) − I(X , Y , ; U , V )

R1 − RM

≥

−I(Y ; V ) + I(X , Y ; U , V )

R2 − RM

≥

−I(X ; U ) + I(X , Y ; U , V ) .

Notably, any achievable rate 3-tuple (R1 , R2 , Rc ) for these conditions, also satisfies the achievable
conditions described in section 2.3 since

R1

>
≥
=
=

1
log |T1 (j)|
∀j
n
1
H(T1 (j))
∀j
n
1
(H(T1 (j)) − H(T1 (j)|X)) ∀j
n
1
I(X; T1 (j)).
∀j
n

rec
Thus, Rrec
out is a subset of Rout . In fact the proposed outer bound Rout is exactly Rout when

RS = RK = 0. Thus the outer bound is tight in this case, and constraints on storage capacity in
terms of bits and constraints on leakage in terms of mutual information are closely related.

Special Cases in the Literature

A comprehensive study of biometric privacy and secrecy was conducted by Ignatenko and Williams
[35]. Even though direct identification and sensor communication leakage are not considered, fundamental information theoretic results on secret capacities with and without passwords in biometric
systems were thoroughly studied, including both chosen secret cases and generated secret cases. The
outer bound derived in this paper matches the special cases presented in their work as four theorems:
theorem 1 on generated secret cases, theorem 3 on chosen secret cases, theorem 5 on zero leakage
generated secret with password cases, and theorem 7 on zero leakage chosen secret with password
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cases. Each can be derived from our results by removing the modules or constraints that are not
considered. These results were also obtained by Lai, Ho, and Poor [47], while in [47] attackers with
side information are also considered. Note that in [35], the achievable rate regions are exact that
both achievability and converse yields the same bound. This also indicates that our outer bound is
tight in the sense that in many special cases it matches the achievable regions.
Identification and secrets in biometrics were considered simultaneously later also by Williams and
Ignatenko [89], while passwords and sensor communication leakage were not included. The exact
achievable rate region found in Ignatenko [89] is a special case of the outer bound in this paper, thus
our bound is tight in this case.

2.4.2

Direct Identity Control versus Key Based Identity Control

In key based identity control, as we mentioned, the system has a risk of leaking key information if
the list of encrypted keys are compromised. The question is then the following: is there any benefit
offered by key based identity control that may justify this risk? In other words, what is the benefit
of combining information theoretic secured modules in conjunction with computationally secured
modules in biometric systems?
d
To see this, consider direct identity control systems with identification rate RM
without secret
d
hiding. The corresponding key based identity control system will need to have RSk = RM
to serve

the same number of users, as each user will be identified by each individual encrypted key. Note
k
= 0 in key based identification system. Thus we have Rdout ,
that the direct identification rate RM

converse of achievable rate region of direct identity control systems, as

Rdout =


d
RM
− RK ≤

I(X ; U ) + I(Y ; V )
− I(X , Y , ; U , V )

d
L1 + RK − RM
≥

− I(Y ; V ) + I(X , Y ; U , V )

d
L2 + RK − RM
≥

− I(X ; U ) + I(X , Y ; U , V ) ,
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while Rsk
out , the converse of the achievable rate region for secret key based identity control systems,
is

Rsk
out =


RSsk − RK ≤

I(X ; U ) + I(Y ; V )
− I(X , Y , ; U , V )

L1 + RK ≥

− I(Y ; V ) + I(X , Y ; U , V )

L2 + RK ≥

− I(X ; U ) + I(X , Y ; U , V ) .

d
, the secret key base system
Thus when both systems serve the same number of users, RSsk = RM

requires less leakage of template information. This means if one has confidence in, or is willing
to risk, security of the encryption list, there is a gain in protection of information leakage of the
biometric templates.

2.4.3

Insights for System Designs

A classical idea of biometric template protection system called fuzzy commitment scheme by Jeols
and Wattenberg. The framework considers identification through secret recovery, while no leakage
constraint was considered. The idea is to store the helper data f (x) = x − w and encryption f2 (w),
where w is a codeword of some error correcting code. Note the w then can be think of as the secret
in our framework. When a query data comes in, the difference w′ = y − x − w is computed. If x
and y are from the same individual and hence close, w′ is then close to w. If w and w′ are close
enough to be within the error correcting capacity of the code, w and f2 (w) can then be recovered
and used as identification. Note that since x − w is stored in the data base, recover w is equivalent
to recovering x. Later similar ideas are proposed by O’Sullivan and Lai [60] and Martinian et al.
[55], known as template protection by syndrome or distributed source coding, that f (x) and f2 (x)
are stored, and then the query y is used with helper data f (x) to recover x and hence f2 (x). Here
the function f is usually the low density generator matrix of a low density parity check code.
Note that, however, recovering x requires min(L1 , L2 ) ≥ RM + H(X|Y ) [60, 48, 55]. However, from
the discussion in 2.4.1, we know that recognition is possible even when L1 and L2 are smaller than
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H(X|Y ). Thus a new design which beyond identification through direct or indirect reconstruction
of the template is need. In fact, simple codes are proposed and proven to work very close to the
presented theoretical outer bound for simple theoretical examples [48].

2.5

Conclusion and Remarks

In this chapter, we develop a general information theoretic framework for biometric secrecy systems.
This framework captures the fundamental property of major biometric system designs, including
key-binding, key-generating, biometric cryptosystems, and cancelable biometrics. In addition to
considering information leakage due to the database being compromised, we also consider cases
where the communication link between the database and sensor is compromised. An outer bound
on system capacity is presented; the bound is tight that it coincides with results in the literatures
in many special cases.
The results also lead to a theoretical comparison of direct identification systems versus key based
identification systems. When one builds a key based identification system, there is an additional
risk of encrypted key database being compromised. However, assuming the encryption is intact, one
gains more protection of the biometric privacy, in the event of attacks on helper data in the database
or communication link between sensor and database.
The obtained bound also provides insights on system designs. An interesting consequence of the
presented outer bound and its tightness is that identification is possible while reconstruction of the
original signal is not possible. This is different from the idea of identification through reconstruction
such as the use of Slepain-Wolf coding. However it does not rule out the possibility of modifying
and extending the way which Slepain-Wolf coding could be used, such as partial reconstruction or
rate distortion.
An important category of security concern whose fundamental result is not obtained in this work
is conditional leakage. In conditional leakage cases, one assumes that the secret may be stolen and
may be used along with the helper data to gain more information about the biometrics. Conditional

27

leakage in some biometric systems is studied by Ignatenko and Willems [35], while only the database
is assumed to be vulnerable, and only secret reconstruction is considered.

2.6
2.6.1

Proof of the Converse Outer Bound
Identification and Secrecy Rates

n(RS + RM )
≤

log |S(J )| + log |J |

=

H(S(J), J)

=

I(S(J), J; T1 , T2 (J), K(J)) + H(S(J), J|T1 , T2 (J), K(J))

≤

I(S(J), J; T1 , T2 (J), K(J)) + F,

=

I(S(J), J; T1 ) + I(S(J), J; K(J)|T1 ) + I(S(J), J; T2 (J)|T1 , K(J)) + F

≤

I(S(J), J; T1 ) + nRK + I(S(J), J; T2 |T1 , K(J)) + F

=

I(J; T1 ) + I(S(J); T1 |J) + I(S(J), J; T2 (J)|T1 , K) + nRK + F

≤

0 + nδ + I(S(J), J; T2 (J)|T1 , K) + nRK + F

=

I(S(J), J; K, T2 (J)|T1 , K) + nRK + F + nδ

=

I(S(J), J, T1 ; T2 (J)|K(J)) − I(T1 ; T2 (J)|K(J)) + nRK + F + nδ

≤

I(S(J), J, T1 ; T2 (J)|K(J)) + nRK + F + nδ

(a)

=

I(S(J), T1 (J); T2 (J)|K) + nRK + F + nδ

(b)

I(X n (J); T1 , S(J)|K(J)) + I(Y n (J); T2 |K(J))

=

−I(X n (J), Y n (J); T1 (J), S(J), T2 (J)|K(J)) + nRK + F + nδ
(c)

=

(d)

≤

I(X n (J); T1 (J), S(J), K(J)) + I(Y n (J); T2 (J), K(J))
−I(X n (J), Y n (J); T1 (J), S(J), T2 (J), K(J)) + nRK + F + nδ
I(X n (J); U n ) + I(Y n (J), V n ) − I(X n (J), Y n (J), ; U n , V n ) + nRK + F + nδ,
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where

U n = (X n−1 , T1 , S, K)

(2.8)

V (n = (Y n−1 , T2 , K).

Divide both sides by n, move nRK to the left hand side, and take the limit as n gets large, we have

Rs + Rm − Rk ≤ I(X ; U ) + I(Y ; V ) − I(X , Y , ; U , V ),

(2.9)

I(X ; U ) , H(X ) + H(U ) − H(X , U ),

(2.10)

where

and H(X ) is the entropy rate of the random process X n . In particular, for X and Y being i.i.d.,
we have the last being

I(X n ; T1 , S, K) + I(Y n , T2 , K) − I(X n , Y n ; T1 , S, K, T2 ) + nRK + F + δ
(e)

=

nI(X; U ) + nI(Y ; V ) − nI(X, Y ; U, V ) + nRK + F + δ.

By dividing n on both sides and taking limit as n gets large, we have

Rs + Rm − Rk ≤ I(X; U ) + I(Y ; V ) − I(X, Y ; U, V ).

(2.11)

It is clear from definitions that U n − X n − Y n and X n − Y n − V n . This completes the proof.
For (a), define T∗1 = T1 \ T1 (J), we have
I(S(J), J, T1 ; T2 (J)|K(J))
= I(S(J), J, T∗1 , T1 (J); T2 |K(J))
= I(S(J), T1 (J); T2 (J)|K(J)) + I(J, T∗1 ; T2 (J)|S(J), K(J), T1 (J))
= I(S(J), T1 (J); T2 (J)|K(J)) + I(J; T2 (J)|S(J), K(J), T1 (J)) + I(T∗1 ; T2 (J)|S(J), K(J), T1 (J))
= I(S(J), T1 (J); T2 (J)|K(J)) + 0 + 0.
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Equality (b) utilizes lemma 6 of Westover and O’Sullivan [86], which states that

I(α; β|C) ≥ I(A; α|C) + I(B; β|C) − I(A, B; α, β|C),

(2.12)

with equality if and only if I(A, α; B, β|C) = I(A, B|C). Equality (b) follows from substituting
(A, B, C, α, β) with (X n , Y n , K, (S, T1 ), (T2 )) and then showing that equality condition holds. We
have

I(X n , S, T1 ; Y n , T2 |K)
=
(ba)

I(X n , S, T1 ; Y n , K) + I(X n , S, T1 ; T2 |Y n , K)

=

I(X n , k, S, T1 ; Y n |K) + 0

=

I(X n ; Y n |K) + I(S; Y n |K, X n )

(bb)

=

I(X n ; Y n ),

where (ba) results from T2 is a function of (Y n , K), and (bb) follows that K and S are independent
of X n and Y n , and K and S are independent of each other.
The inequality (d) is based on the fellowing Lemma 1. Lemma 1 Let An be a random processes
such that its entropy rate exists and B be a random variable and Ci = (Ai−1 , B), we have
I(An ; B) ≤ I(An ; C n )

(2.13)

By substitute (A, B, C) three times to (X, (T1 , S, K, ), U ), (Y, (T2 , K), V ), and ((X, Y ), (T1 , T2 , S, K), (U, V )),
we get the inequality (c).
proof

I(An ; C n )
= I(An ; An−1 , B, · · · , B)
≥ I(An ; B)
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For cases where X and Y are i.i.d., (c) can be derived from writing the mutual information terms
in the form of I(X n ; T1 , S, K) into telescoping sum
n

I(X ; T1 , S, K)

=

n
X

I(Xi ; T1 , S, K|X i−1 )

i=1

≤
=

n
X

I(Xi ; T1 , S, K, X i−1 )

i=1

n
X

I(Xi ; Ui ).

i=1

Then using standard argument through defining a time sharing parameter T and variable U =
(UT , T ), we get the last inequality.

2.6.2

Privacy and Secrecy leakage

nL1
≥

Mc
1 X
I(X n (j); T1 (j))
Mc j=1

=

I(X n (J); T1 (J)|J)

(a)

=

I(J, X n (J); T1 (J))

≥

H(X n (J), J) − H(X n (J), J|T1 (J)) − H(S(J)|X n (J), J, T1 (J), K(J))

=

H(X n (J), J) − I(X n (J), J; K(J)|T1 (J)) − H(X n (J), J|T1 (J), K(J))
−H(S(J)|X n (J), J, T1 (J), K(J))

≥

H(X n (J), J) − H(K) − H(X n (J), J, S(J)|T1 (J), K(J))

=

H(X n (J), J) − H(K) − H(J, S(J)|T1 (J), K(J)) − H(X n (J)|J, S(J), T1 (J), K(J))

=

H(X n (J), J) − H(K) − H(J, S(J)|T1 (J), K(J), T2 ) − I(T2 ; J, S(J)|T1 (J), K(J))

(b)

−H(X n (J)|J, S(J), T1 (J), K(J))

≥

H(J) − H(K) + H(X n ) − H(X n (J)|J, S(J), T1 (J), K(J)) − I(T2 ; J, S(J)|T1 (J), K(J)) − F

≥

H(J) − H(K) + I(X n (J); J, S(J), T1 (J), K(J)) − I(T2 ; J, S(J), T1 (J)|K(J)) − F

=

nRM − nRK + I(X n (J); J, S(J), T1 (J), K(J)) − I(T2 ; J, S(J), T1 (J)|K(J)) − F
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(c)

≥

nRM − nRK + I(X n (J); S(J), T1 (J)|K(J)) − I(T2 ; J, S(J), T1 (J)|K(J)) − F

≥

nRM − nRK − I(Y n (J); T2 , K(J)) + I(X n (J), Y n (J); T1 , S(J), T2 , K(J)) − F

(e)

nRM − nRK − I(Y n ; V n ) + I(X n , Y n ; U n , V n ) − F

(d)

=

where (a) comes from J being independent of T1 (J); (b) follows from Fano’s inequality of the term
ˆ
ˆ S(J)),
H(J, S(J)|T1 (J), K(J)) ≤ H(J,
and X N (J) and J are independent; (c) follows from X n (J)
being independent of J and K(J), and also J and K(J) being independent of each other; (d) and
(e) both follow the same arguments as in the identification and secrecy rate proof. Dividing both
sides by n, we have
L1 + RK ≥ RM − I(Y ; V ) + I(X , Y ; U , V ).

(2.14)

Similar, for L2 , we have

nL2
≥

Mc
1 X
I(Y n (j); T2 (j))
Mc j=1

=

I(Y n (J); T2 (J)|J)

(a)

=

I(J, Y n (J); T2 (J))

≥

H(Y n (J), J) − H(Y n (J), J|T2 (J)) − H(S(J)|Y n (J), J, T2 (J), K(J))

≥

H(Y n (J), J) − H(K) − H(Y n (J), J, S(J)|T2 (J), K(J))

=

H(Y n (J), J) − H(K) − H(J, S(J)|T2 (J), K(J)) − H(Y n (J)|J, S(J), T2 (J), K(J))

=

H(Y n (J), J) − H(K) − H(J, S(J)|T2 (J), K(J), T1 ) − I(T1 ; J, S(J)|T2 (J), K(J))

(b)

−H(Y n (J)|J, S(J), T2 (J), K(J))

≥

H(J) − H(K) + H(Y n ) − H(Y n (J)|J, S(J), T2 (J), K(J)) − I(T1 ; J, S(J)|T2 (J), K(J)) − F

≥

H(J) − H(K) + I(Y n (J); T2 (J), K(J)) − I(T2 ; J, S(J), T1 (J)|K(J)) − F

(c)

=

H(J) − H(K) + I(Y n (J); T2 (J), K(J)) − I(T2 ; T1 (J)|K(J), J, S(J)) − F

≤

nRM − nRK + I(Y n (J); T2 (J)|K(J)) − I(T2 ; J, S(J), T1 (J)|K(J)) − F

=

nRM − nRK − I(X n ; U n ) + I(X n , Y n ; U n , V n ) − F.
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Dividing both sides by n, and let n go large, we have

L2 + RK − RM ≤ −I(X n ; U n ) + I(X n , Y n ; U n , V n ).

(2.15)

Inequality (c) is from the following lemma: I(A; f (B, C)|B) = 0 if B⊥A, B⊥C, and C⊥(A, B), or
equivalently, H(A|B) = H(A|B, f (B, C)) We have

H(A|B, f (B, C))

≥ H(A|B, C)
= H(A, B, C) − H(B, C)
= H(A, B) + H(C) − H(B) − H(C)
= H(A|B).

On the other hand, H(A|B, f (B, C)) ≤ H(A|B). Thus H(A|B)−H(A|B, f (B, C)) = I(A; f (B, C)|B) =
0 given the conditions holds. Notice that

I(T2 ; J, S(J), T1 (J)|K(J)) = I(T2 ; J, S(J)|K(J)) − I(T2 ; T1 (J)|K(J), J, S(J)),
and substitute (A, B, C, f (A, B) with ((J, S(J)), K(J), X n (J), T1 (J)), we have equality (c).
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(2.16)

Chapter 3

Secured Biometric System Designs
Using Linear Codes
In the previous chapter, an information theoretic framework is presented along with an outer rate
bound which characterizes the fundamental trade off between biometric system utility and security.
In this chapter, we look at the system design and coding theoretic aspects of the problem. In coding
theory for communication problems, one focuses on the actual design and algorithm of codes that can
be implemented, and attempts to approach the limits established from information theoretic results.
Here we bring a similar concept of coding for practical system designs into biometric systems.
Instead of developing new kinds of error correcting codes or source codes, we focus on the concept
of translating biometric system design problems into coding problems. The results in this chapter
have the following flavor: if one has an error correcting code, or a source code, for a noise or source
random process, then one also has a good biometric system with the identical random process as
noise model or biometric source model. Also, if one has an decoding algorithm for the code, it can
be used as the corresponding identification or verification problem. Thus, this chapter introduces
several ways to turn biometric system design problems into code design problems that the vast
amount of coding theory literature can then be used as powerful tools in biometrics.
In this chapter, we translate two biometric problems into coding problems by proposing the actually
system design using linear codes, and then establishing the theoretical performances of the resulting
biometric systems. In both problems, we focus on discrete cases. The first problem is to design an
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identification system with constraints on the number of bits of the helper data per individual, and
the number of bits communicating from sensor to database. Despite the theoretical performance of
the proposed system design is suboptimal in this case, it still shows the potential of linear codes in
identification problems. Also in a simple theoretical case, we illustrate that near optimal identification performance can be achieved while signal reconstruction is not possible, and it is robust against
uncertainty in the noise model.
In the second case, we study the problem of secret binding in biometric system. In this problem,
the information leakage of template and secret from the database is considered, but not from the
communication channel. We propose a simple system design that can achieve optimal identification
and secret capacity trade off shown in the last chapter and in other literature. In addition, we
also propose an alternative system which is suboptimal but reduces the potential computational
complexity of the problem.

3.1

Identification System with Finite Storage and
Communication Constraints

Three aspects defining the first identification problem are the environment under which identification
takes place, the identification system itself, and measures of performance. These follow the problem
setting in [88], which is a slight modification of the general model described in the previous chapter.

Environment

The environment consists of six elements, denoted as

E = (Px , X , Py|x , Y, Mc , Pj ).

(3.1)

Mc = 2nRc is the total number of individuals to be registered in the system, and Rc is defined as the
identification rate. Each pattern template is a length n sequence with each element taking values
over a discrete set X . Each pattern is drawn independently from a distribution Px , denoted as
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x(j), i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Mc }. The set of all Mc patterns to be recognized is denoted as C. In the training
phase, we assume that the biometric system observes all template patterns x(j).
In the testing phase, an individual index j is drawn from {1, 2, · · · , Mc } based on an index distribution
Pj which we assume to be uniform here. The corresponding object sequence xj is then presented to
the identification system through a noisy channel whose transition probability is Py|x , where each
element of y takes values over the set Y.
In this section, the noisy channel is assumed to be additive that the input and our are both integers
X = Y which are finite subset of Z. The noise is denoted as z which is a length n sequence drawn
from a distribution Pz , independent of x(j), ∀j, and any part of identification systems. Hence
Py|x (y|x) = Pz (y − x),

(3.2)

and the identification system observes data

y = x + z.

(3.3)

The Biometric Identification System

An identification system consists three parts: a database compression function f , a sensor compression function g, and an identification algorithm φ.
The database compression f maps each object sequence xj to a compressed sensor data t1 (j) ∈ T1 ,
where L1 is the database compression rate. Notice that the definition of L1 is different from the
leakage definition presented in the previous chapter measured by mutual information between X
and T1 .
Similarly, the sensor compression function g maps an observed y to a compressed sensor data t2 ∈ T2 ,
where L2 = log |T2 | is defined to be the sensor compression rate.
In cases of system design using linear codes, the sensor compression and database compression are
carried out by using two matrices H of size nT1 by n for the database and G of size nT2 by n for
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Figure 3.1: Identification system design using linear codes
the sensor, such that
t1 (j) = Hx(j)

(3.4)

is the compressed database data of the template with index j, and

t2 = Gy

(3.5)

is the compressed sensor data. The set of all database data t1 (j), j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Mc } is denoted as
T1 . In designing database compression H and sensor compression G, we assume that the probability
mass functions Px and Pz are given.
We are interested in designing good identification systems given (Rc , L1 , L2 , Px , Pz ). The identification algorithm φ takes T1 and t2 as inputs and computes an estimate ĵ of the true object index,
assuming the probabilities px and pz are given. It consists of a noise estimation algorithm and an
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index estimation algorithm. The noise estimation algorithm is denoted as

d(t1 (i), t2 ) : T1 × T2 → X n ∪ {e},

(3.6)

that for each individual index i, it computes an estimated noise under the hypothesis that the query
in the testing phase belongs to the ith individual. The estimated noise of the ith object is denoted
as
ẑ(i) = d(t1 (i), t2 ).

(3.7)

If the algorithm fails for the ith index, subject to some criteria of failure depending on the system
design, d(·, ·) outputs an error e. After the identification system completes noise estimation for
all individual indexes, it proceeds to index estimation. Since an index j is chosen uniformly in
the testing phase, for index estimation, the index estimation algorithm simply selects the index
estimate ĵ to be the index associated with the largest Pz (ẑ(i)). We define Pz (e) = 0, so that the
identification system always rejects indexes with noise estimation error. From now on in this paper,
j always denotes the true object index selected in the test phase, and i ∈ {1, · · · , Mc } \ {j}.
Note that Pz (ẑ(i)) is used to select the estimated index, instead of the joint probability mess of Px,z .
This is because x is not directly stored in the database, estimating x may be difficult or impossible
when the database compression rate is small.

Performance Measure

An identification system makes an error if ĵ 6= j. The average probability of error of an ensemble of
identification system design is defined to be

Pen =

X

f,g,C,z

P (ĵ 6= j|C, z, f, g)PC (C)Pz (z)Pf,g (f, g),

(3.8)

which is averaging over all realizations of C, z, and the identification system. Note that Pf,g (f, g) is
necessary to consider when parts of the system are randomly generated, such as system designs in
which random codes are employed, that the density is specified when the ensemble of identification

38

system designs is defined. Due to the i.i.d. assumption of templates, we have

PC (C) =

Y

Px (x).

(3.9)

x∈C

Probability of error depends on the pattern length n, while we focus on the limiting cases where n
is large.
Definition 3.1 A three rate tuple (Rc , L1 , L2 ) is said to be achievable in an environment E if there
exists a sequence of identification systems (f n , g n , φn ) such that Pen goes to zero as n goes to infinity.
Definition 3.2 The set of all achievable rate tuple of a system is defined as the achievable rate region
of this system.
We are interested in system designs that yields large achievable rate region. An inner and an outer
achievable rate region bounds of this framework was obtained by Westover and O’Sullivan [86] and
the previous chapter.

3.1.1

Truncation Encoding

In this section, we describe a simple encoding strategy called truncation encoding to illustrate four
ideas:

1 The concept of “noise estimation” and how it can be used for identification.
2 A performance level that is very close to theoretical limit can be achieved in a simple method
that per individual computation complexity is very low.
3 Good identification performance is possible even when reconstruction of the original template
given both helper data and the query is impossible.
4 Robust identification against modeling error of the noise is possible.

In this sub-section, it is assumed that each element of a pattern sequence is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) drawn from a distribution Qx on GF (r), where GF (r) denotes a Golid Field
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of r elements. Similarly, each element of the noise vector is i.i.d. drawn from Qz on the same GF (r).
Let H = [InT1 0] and G = [InT2 0], where InT1 and InT2 are identity matrices of size nT1 and nT2 respectively. Thus t1 (j) is the first nT1 elements of x(j), and t2 is the first nT2 elements of y = xj + z.
Let nmin = min(nT1 , nT2 ). For any length n sequence a, anmin denotes the sequence of the first nmin
elements of a, and ancmin denotes the rest of a. By definition, we know that T1,nmin (i) = xnmin (i)
and t2,nmin = ynmin .
The noise estimation algorithm works as follows. For each pair of (t1 (i), t2 ), the algorithm checks if
(tnmin (i), t2,nmin ) is in the jointly typical set Tnxy,ǫ
, where the jointly typical set Tnxy
is defined as
min
min
Tnxy,ǫ
min

= {(x, y) ∈ X nmin × X nmin :

1
log P (x) − H(Qx ) < ǫ
nmin
1
−
log P (y) − H(Qx ∗ Qz ) < ǫ
nmin
1
log P (x, y) − H(Qx ) − H(Qz ) < ǫ},
−
nmin

−

(3.10)

where Qx ∗ Qz denotes the output distribution of a noisy channel with input distribution Qx and
, otherwise it outputs an e
additive noise distribution Qz . It proceeds if (t1,nmin (i) , t2,nmin ) ∈ Tnxy,ǫ
min
indicating an error. The algorithm computes

ẑi,nmin = t2,nmin − t1,nmin (i) = xi,nmin − xj,nmin + znmin ,

(3.11)

and then concatenates it with n − nmin zeros to get the estimated noise ẑ(j). Finally, the system
selects the index
ĵ = arg

max

k∈{1,2,···,Mc }

Pz (ẑk ) = arg

max

k∈{1,2,···,Mc }

Pz (ẑk,nmin )

(3.12)

as its estimated index.
To see how truncation encoding works for identification, consider the following example. Let template
pattern A and template Pattern B be realization of a binary Bernoulli 1/2 source as shown in Figure
3.1.1. The additive noise elements are assumed to be drawn i.i.d. from Bernoulli 1/10. Let L1 = L2
thus the truncation encoding cuts off the right side of each pattern and stores the result in the
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database. Then it subtract each pattern from the truncated sensor input and obtain the results. As
we can see, even though half of the images are not available, one can still infer that the query data
is from individual A, as the estimated noise is a more “typical” pattern of Bernoulli 1/10, and on
the other hand if the query is from individual B, it is a very unusual or “atypical” situation. The
following theorem provides the quantitative side of this intuition.
Theorem 3.1 The probability of ĵ 6= j goes to zero as n goes to infinity if
Rc < min(T1 , T2 )(H(Qx ∗ Qz ) − H(Qz ) − 3ǫ).

(3.13)

Proof
There are two situations under which the truncation encoding identification system makes an error:

.
• The first situation is when (t1,nmin (j), t2,nmin ) is not in Tnxy,ǫ
min
but there exists at least one other
• The second situation is when (t1,nmin (j), t2,nmin ) ∈ Tnxy,ǫ
min
object index i such that (t1,nmin j), t2,nmin ) ∈ Tnxy,ǫ
and P (ẑ(j)) ≥ P (ẑj ).
min
The probability of the first situation goes to ǫ as n goes large, and ǫ can be chosen to be arbitrarily
small because of the standard properties of jointly typical set and the law of large number. The
probability of the second situation can be upper bounded by the probability that there exists at
, regardless if the resulting noise
least one other individual index i with (t1,nmin (i) , t2,nmin ) ∈ Tnxy,ǫ
min
estimate is more likily than the true index or not. Hence the probability of the second condition is
bounded by
X

P (j)

j∈1,2,···,Mc

(a)

X

=

z∈{0,1}n

X

=

z∈{0,1}n

=
zcn

min

X

P (z)

z∈{0,1}n


|z, i
P ∃i : (xnmin (i) , ynmin ) ∈ Tnxy,ǫ
min

P (z)P (∃i : (xnmin (i), y2,nmin ) ∈ Tnxy,ǫ
|z)
min
P (zcnmin )P (znmin )P (∃i : (t1,nmin (i), t2,nmin ) ∈ Tnxy,ǫ
|znmin )
min

X

∈{0,1}n−nmin

P (zcnmin )

X

znmin ∈{0,1}nmin
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P (znmin )

(3.14)

Figure 3.2: Two Bernoulli 1/2 template patterns at the top, left as A and right as B and their
truncated versions at the second row. Both stored helper data add with the truncated query pattern
resulting in two noise estimates. The last step is to check if resulting noise estimates are typical to
the known noise distribution.
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=
zcn
(b)

min

P (∃i : (t1,nmin (i), t2,nmin ) ∈ Tnxy,ǫ
|znmin )
min
X
P (zcnmin )P (∃i : (t1,nmin (i), t2,nmin ) ∈ Tnxy,ǫ
)
min

∈{0,1}n−nmin

X

<

zcn
∈{0,1}n−nmin
min
(c)

=

(d)



P (zcnmin ) 

X

i={2,3,···,Mc }

(Mc − 1) P (xnmin (i), ynmin ) ∈ Tnxy,ǫ
min




xy,ǫ



P (xnmin (i), ynmin ) ∈ Tnmin 

<

(1 + ǫ)2nRc 2−nmin (I(X;Y )−3ǫ)

(e)

(1 + ǫ)2−n(min(T1 ,T2 )(H(Qx ∗Qz )−H(Qz ))−Rc −3ǫ) ,

=

(3.15)

(3.16)
(3.17)
(3.18)

where

(a) follows from that j is uniformly distributed and all x(j) is independently drawn from the same
distribution;
(b) follows from taking the union bound;
(c) follows from that the terms inside the parenthesis of (3.16) is independent of zcnmin ;
(d) follows from the property of jointly typical set under the condition that if xnmin (i) and ynmin (j)
are independent with the same marginals as P (xnmin (j), ynmin (j)), then the probability that
≤ 2−(I(X
(xnmin (i), ynmin ) ∈ Tnxy,ǫ
min

nmin

;Y nmin )−3ǫ)

[20], and elements of xnmin (j) and znmin are

i.i.d. hence so are elements of ynmin ;
(e) follows from

I(X; Y )

= H(X + Z) − H(X + Z|X)

(3.19)

= H(Qx ∗ Qz ) − H(Qz ).

(3.20)

Thus if
Rc < min(T1 , T2 )(H(Qx ∗ Qz ) − H(Qz )) − 3ǫ,

(3.21)

The probability of identification error goes to zero as n goes to infinity.

Corollary In particular, if elements of x(j) are drawn from i.i.d. Bernoulli 12 , and noise is from i.i.d.
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Bernoulli q, we have the lower bound of possible Rc to be

Rc < min(T1 , T2 )(1 − H(q)) − 3ǫ,

(3.22)

where 0 ≤ min(T1 , T2 ) ≤ 1 and H(q) ≤ 1.
Notice that for T1 = T2 = R, the bound (3.22) of Rc is very close to the theoretical inner and outer
bounds computed by Westover [87] and Westover and O’Sullivan [88], where they have shown an
outer bound which is a concave function of R and is slightly above but very close to the straight line
R(1 − H(q)).

Robustness of Truncation Encoding

Here we discuss another interesting example where the noise distribution Qz is partially known. We
assume that each element of x(j) is i.i.d. drawn from the uniform distribution over GF (r). We
assume that each element of z is i.i.d. drawn from a distribution Qz , but only Qz (0) = 1 − q is
known that each element of z takes value 0 with probability 1 − q but the probability mess of other
values are unknown. We want to find the least upper bound on Rc among all such distributions
given R = min(T1 , T2 ) using truncation encoding. This is a constrained optimization problem
X

max H(Qz ) subject to
Qz

k∈GF (r)

qk = q, qk ≥ 0 ∀k

where qk = Qz (k). The maximum can easily be shown to be achieved for qk =

(3.23)

q
r−1

∀k 6= 0. The

least upper bound of Rc is then


R log r + (1 − q) log(1 − q) + q log
where all logarithms are taken base 2.
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q
r−1



,

(3.24)

Identification versus Reconstruction

Note that there are noticeable differences between identification and lossless source coding with side
information. The bits useful in identification systems are different from bits useful for lossless source
coding. Also even if a joint lossless source code is available, it might not be good for identification.
Given two correlated sequences x and y, the achievable rate region of lossless source codes with side
information obtained by Ahlswede and Körner [5] is

Rx

≥ H(X|V ),

(3.25)

Ry

≥ I(Y ; V ),

(3.26)

where V is an auxiliary random variable and X − Y − V is a Markov chain. For x being Bernoulli 21 ,
and y = x+z where z is Bernoulli q, Ry = 1 and Rx = H(q) is an achievable rate pair to reconstruct
x and hence reconstruct z. However, Theorem 1 shows that it is not always necessary to reconstruct
entire x or z for identification. Also theorem 1, [87], and [88] all show that even if lossless coding is
possible for a given identification system with T1 = Rx , T2 = Ry , it is not good for identification if
the compression rates are below the required bounds. A large sensor compression rate T2 = Ry = 1
alone does not yield good performance because even if it is sufficient to reconstruct the true noise
z, it is not sufficient to suppress the probability that there exists another pattern which is jointly
typical with a sequence matching the compressed database and sensor data. From a linear coding
point of view with G for encoding x, the above argument means that the cardinality of each coset
of G is too large to prevent that for all the 2Rc − 1 false objects, the coset G(x(j) + y) does not
contain a sequence which is jointly typical with x(j).

3.1.2

Identification System Designs Using Linear Codes for General
Additive Noise Models

Although the truncation encoding works well for i.i.d. Bernoulli patterns under i.i.d. Bernoulli noise
conditions, we shall see that identification systems using linear codes or ensemble of linear codes, can
be proven to work reasonably well in general noise models. To see this, let us assume that elements
of patterns are i.i.d. drawn from the uniform distribution over GF (r), denoted as Q̄x . The additive
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noise sequence is drawn from a distribution whose mean entropy is nRz for some 0 < Rz < 1. Under
this loose constraint which allows nonstationary noise distributions, it might not be sufficient to have
good statistical properties for identification by simply computing the first nmin elements of the noise
sequence. Notice that when an low density parity check (LDPC) matrix is used for compression,
the codes used are viewed as low density generator matrix (LDGM) codes, which are also known to
have good performance for source coding and channel coding [32] [95]. Under the pattern and noise
assumptions stated above, one can use LDPC codes to design good identification systems as stated
in the following Theorem 2.
By good ensemble for generating LDPC matrices, we mean that the ensemble and noise average
block decoding error goes to zero as n goes to infinity. By good identification system design we mean
that the ensemble and noise average identification error goes to zero as n gets large.
Theorem 3.2: If there exists a good ensemble for generating LDPC matrices of rate R = min(T1 , T2 ),
alone with a syndrome decoding algorithm under a noise distribution with entropy nRz , then there
exists a good identification system design using the same LDPC matrix ensemble and syndrome
decoding algorithm for all Rc < min(T1 , T2 ) − Rz .
The proof is omitted since it follows directly from the following Theorem 3, as LDPC codes being a
special case of linear codes.
Theorem 3.3 If there exists a good ensemble of linear codes of rate R = min(T1 , T2 ) and a decoding
algorithm for a noise distribution with entropy nRz . Then for all Rc < min(T1 , T2 )−Rz , there exists
a good pattern identification system design using the generator matrix of the linear block code, and
the decoding algorithm as noise estimation algorithm under the same noise distribution.

Proof To prove theorem 3, we start by constructing a system design that utilizes a good linear code
and the corresponding decoder, and then we show that the system achieves the stated performance.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that T1 ≤ T2 . Database compression is done by using H,
denoting a parity check matrix generated by the “good” linear code ensemble, such that t1 (j) =
Hx(j). sensor compression is done by a matrix G = [H T 0]T , where 0 is simply the zero matrix.
Let d(·, ·) denotes the syndrome decoding algorithm associated with the linear code ensemble. For
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Figure 3.3: Identification using a linear code and its decoder
each individual index i, the identification computes ẑ(i) = d(t1 (i), t2 ), and selects i that maximizes
P (ẑ(i)). The system makes an error if for the true index j, there exist some i such that P (ẑ(i)) ≤
P (ẑ(j)).
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we bound the probability of error of this system from above by
the probability that there exists an index i, the resulting noise estimate ẑ(i) is typical, or for the
true index j, ẑ(i) is not typical. The typical set Tnz,ǫ is defined as
Tnz,ǫ = {z :
z(j),ǫ

Because the probability of z(j) ∈
/ Tn

1
log P (z) − Rz < ǫ}
n

(3.27)

is ǫ which can be chosen to be arbitrarily small as n gets

large, and the decoding algorithm for inferring zˆj is good that zˆj = z(j) almost surely, we focus on
the probability of index estimation error that there exist some ẑ(i) ∈ Tnz,ǫ . The probability of index
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estimation error is less than
Mc
X

z∈Tnz,ǫ

j=1

=

X

=

X

P (z)P (∃i : d(t1 (j), t2 )) ∈ Tnz,ǫ |z)

(3.30)

X

P (z)P (∃i : d(0, H(x(j) − x(1) + z)) ∈ Tnz,ǫ |z)

X

P (z)P (∃i : d(0, H(x̃)) ∈ Tnz,ǫ )

(3.31)

X

(3.32)

z∈Tnz,ǫ
(b)

=

z∈Tnz,ǫ
(c)

≤

(d)

≤

≤
=

(3.28)
(3.29)

z∈Tnz,ǫ
(a)

P (z)P (∃i : ẑ(j) ∈ Tnz,ǫ |z, i)

P (z)P (∃i : ẑ(j) ∈ Tnz,ǫ |z)

z∈Tnz,ǫ

=

X

P (j)

2nRc

z∈Tnz,ǫ

P (z)P (d(0, H(x̃)) ∈ Tnz,ǫ )

2nRc P (d(0, H(x̃)) ∈ Tnz,ǫ )
X
P (H x̃ = Hz̃|z̃)
2nRc

(3.33)

2nRc

(3.35)

(3.34)

z̃∈Tnz,ǫ

X

2−nT1

z̃∈Tnz,ǫ
(e)

≤

2−n(T1 −Rz −Rc −ǫ) ,

(3.36)

where

(a) follows from the construction of G based on H.
(b) is because elements of x(j) and x(1) both are i.i.d. from the uniform distribution over GF (r),
and x(j) and x(1) are independent of each other and independent of z, so that elements of
x(j) − x(1) + z are also i.i.d. and uniformly distributed, denoted as x̃;
(c) follows from union bound and there are totally 2nRc − 1 terms in the sum;
(d) follows from that x̃ is independent of z, see (b);
(e) The cardinality of Tnz,ǫ has upper bound 2n(Rz +ǫ ). Hence the probability of index estimation
error goes to zero as n goes to infinity if

Rc < min(T1 , T2 ) − Rz − ǫ.
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(3.37)

Note that clearly if the complexity of the decoding algorithm is O(f (n)), the complexity of the
identification system per object is also O(f (n)). Hence Theorem 3 not only connects good linear
code design to good identification system design, it also connects low complexity algorithms for
decoding linear code to noise estimation in identification systems.
LDPC codes can be used for non-i.i.d. noise. For example, Eckford, Kschischang, and Pasupathy
[24] analyzed LDPC codes for Gilbert-Elliot Channels, which are binary symmetric channels with
crossover probability depending on Markov processes, and Nicola, Alajaji, and Linder [58] developed
decoding algorithms for LDPC codes with a queue-based channel. Based on Theorem 3 and [60],
LDPC codes with the algorithms by [24, 58] can be used for good identification system design for
those noise models in identification systems.

3.2

Optimal Trade-off Between Identification and
Secrecy-Key Binding Using Linear Codes

We now consider the trade-off between biometric identification capacity and secret binding capacity.
As discussed in the previous chapter, this is an important template protection design under the
catagory of biometric cryptosystems. We focus on designing systems that can be proved to achieve
good performance utilizing good linear codes. In this problem, for each individual enrolled, a
template of a biometric trait is measured and a secret is selected, independent of the identity and
measured template. Both the template and the secret are used to generate the helper data which is
stored in the database. Note that the template and secret are themselves not stored in the database.
During identification, the biometric system receives a query signal. The goals of the system are to
infer the identity to which this query belongs, and recover the secret of this individual. The system
requirements are that the helper data contains a negligible amount of information about the secret,
and the identification error should be small. The questions of interest are how many individuals
can be enrolled in the systems, how many secrets can be generated, and what the trade-off between
them are. The overall system is illustrated in Fig. 3.4. Note that only attacks at the database
are considered in this section, which is a degenerated case of the model discussed in the previous
chapter.
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Figure 3.4: The identification and secret binding system
In the following sections, capital case denotes the random variables, lower case denotes realizations
of random variables, and bold case denotes sequences and vectors. The biometric template of each
individual is denoted as a length n sequence xj = (xj1 , · · · , xjn ) ∈ X n where j ∈ {1, · · · , MJ } is
the index of the individual and MJ is the total number of individual enrolled in the system. Each
template xj is modeled as a realization drawn independent and identically from a biometric source
random process governed by a sequence of distributions pnX , whose entropy rate is assumed to exist.
Note that X is independent of the index j. The query signal y ∈ Y n is modeled as a noisy version
of a biometric template drawn from a sequence of distributions pnY|X , that the query signal y can
be thought of as the output of a template x passing through a noisy channel. When the noise is
additive and independent of the source, we denote the additive noise as z drawn from a sequence
of distribution pnZ such that y = x + z. Throughout this paper, we focus on discrete cases, and X
and Y are fields. In practice, they may be integers as a result of quantization. Each individual is
assumed to be equally likely to present the query input that p(i) =
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1
Ms .

For each individual j, one template is measured and a secret is uniformly drawn from a set S
independent of one another, the individual indexes j, and the templates X(j). The cardinality of
S is denoted as Ms . A large Ms suggests that it is harder to guess the secret of an individual and
hence the system is safer. The measured template and selected secret are used to generate the helper
data which will be enrolled and stored in the database with the index. This process is modeled as
the encoding part of the system: an encoder function f takes an input x(j) and a secret s(j) ∈ S to
produce the helper data
t(j) = f (s(j), x(j)).

(3.38)

The identification process is modeled as a decoder mapping g which takes the query y along with S
ˆ
to produce an estimate of subject index î and an estimate of the secret s(j)

(ĵ, sˆj ) = φ (y, t(1), · · · , t(n)) .

(3.39)

Note that the decoder does not have any knowledge about what are the realizations of the secrets,
but only the set S from which they are drawn. The system requirements of small information leakage about the secret from helper data, small identification error, and design for a large number of
individuals and secret choices can then be cast as an information theoretic problem.

Definition 1 Achievability: A pair of identification rate and secrecy key rate (RJ , T2 ) is achievable in
the biometric identification and secret binding setting if for all δ > 0 and for n large enough, there
exists an encoder f (·) and a decoder φ(·) such that:


ˆ 6= (j, s(j))
Pr (ĵ, s(j))
1
log MJ
n
1
log MS
n

1
I(S(j); T(j))
n

≤ δ

(3.40)

≥ RJ − δ

(3.41)

≥ T2 − δ

(3.42)

≤ δ ∀j.

(3.43)

The achievable rate region is the set of all achievable rate pairs and is denoted as R. In the work of
Ignatenko and Willems [36, 89], the achievable rate region of i.i.d. sources with independent i.i.d.
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additive noise is proved to be:

R = {(RJ , T2 ) : 0 ≤ RJ + T2 ≤ I(X; Y )} .

(3.44)

Note that the X and Y are not in bold case, as the source and noise are assumed to be i.i.d. in their
derivation. In particular, they also show that for i.i.d. Bernoulli

1
2

source with i.i.d. Bernoulli noise

q independent of the source, a simple linear code is able to achieve the optimal rate region [89].

3.2.1

Summary of Results

We summarize the results and contribution of this section as three main theorems. The entropy
rates of distributions pnX , pnY , pnZ , pnX,Y , and the conditionals pnX|Y , pnY|X are assumed to exist. Before
we present the key theorems, we introduce the following three definitions.
Definition 3.3 A sequence of source codes is said to be good for a sequence of source pnX if it
asymptotically achieves the optimal lossless source coding rate H(X ).
Definition 3.4 A sequence of decoders is said to be good for a good sequence of source codes of pnX if
it can reconstruct the typical sequences of the sequence of pnX with probability 1 − ǫ(n), where ǫ(n)
approaches zero as n gets large.
Definition 3.5 A good sequence of universal source codes for two sources pnX and pnZ asymptotically
achieves optimal lossless source coding rates for both sources.
The main results are as follows.
Theorem 3.4 For arbitrary pnX,Y with all entropy rates assumed to exist, the achievable rate region
of identification and secret binding trade-off is

Ra =



1
(RJ , T2 ) : RI + T2 ≤ I(X; Y) .
n

(3.45)

Comment: The converse proof is a direct generalization of Ignatenko and Willems [35, 89], and a
special case of the result in the previous chapter.
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Theorem 3.5 If there exists a good code for a source pnX with a good decoder, a system can be
designed to achieve optimal identification and secret binding trade-off as in eq. (3.45) for arbitrary
pnY|X if the entropy rates exist.

Comment: Theorem 5 requires a good decoder for source X, whose entropy rate may be high. In
practice, there may not be a low complexity decoder available. Thus one may choose a suboptimal
system design that only requires a simpler decoder, which motivates the next result.

Theorem 3.6 Assume the query noise is additive and independent of the template source. If there
exists a good universal code for sources pnX and pnZ with good decoder only for pnZ , then a system
can be designed to achieve the rate region

R2 = {(RJ , T2 ) : RJ + T2 ≤ H(X ) − H(Z)} ,

(3.46)

where H(X ) and H(Z) denote the entropy rates of pnX and pnZ .

Comment: This Theorem requires only a decoder which is good for Z, whose entropy rate is usually
smaller than that of X in practice. It is easier to build a low complexity practical decoder for a
smaller entropy rate distribution. However there is a small loss in the performance. Several results
on universal linear codes are available, such as the seminal paper by Csiszár [21]. As shown by
Theorem 1, we know that R2 ⊆ Ra . For example, for binary symmetric Bernoulli source p and
binary symmetric noise q, it is easy to show that R2 is strictly contained in Ra .

3.2.2

Converse for Theorem 4

The converse proof presented here is a generalization of the converse proof for i.i.d. source and noise
models proved derived by Willems and Ignatenko [89]. We observe that their proof can be readily
applied to arbitrary source and noise distributions as long as their entropy rates exist. Despite the
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result is a special case of the general result in Chapter 2, we here present a specific proof for the
converse of Theorem 4, while is easier to understand.


ˆ 6= (j, s(j)) , where (ĵ, s(j))
ˆ = φ (y, t(1), · · · , t(n)).
We are interested in the error probability Pe = P (ĵ, s(j))
From Fano’s inequality we know

ˆ sˆJ ) ≤ 1 + Pe log |MJ ||MS |
H(j, s(j)|J,
=

1 + Pe n(RJ + T2 )

≤ 1 + δn(RJ + T2 ),

(3.47)

where the last inequality follows from the error constraint of system. The converse proof is derived
as follows:

H(J, S(j))

(a)

=

(b)

≤

ˆ SˆJ )
I(J, S(j); T(1), · · · , T(MJ ), Y) + H(J, S(j)|T(1), · · · , T(MJ ), Y, J,
ˆ SˆJ )
I(J, S(j); T(1), · · · , T(MJ ), Y) + H(J, S(j)|J,

ˆ
ˆ S(J))
The second term H(J, SJ |J,
can be bounded using Fano’s inequality. We then focus on the
first term:

I(J, S(j); T(1), · · · , T(MJ ), Y)
=
(c)

≤

(d)

=

(e)

=

(f )

≤

I(J, S(j); T(1), · · · , T(MJ )) + I(J, S(j); Y|T(1), · · · , T(MJ ))
I(J, S(j); T(1), · · · , T(MJ )) + H(Y) − H(Y|X, J, S(j), T1 , · · · , T(MJ ))
I(J, S(j); T(1), · · · , T(M (j))) + I(X; Y)
M (j)
1 X
I(S(j); T(j)) + I(X; Y)
MJ j=1

nδ + I(X; Y),

(3.48)

where

ˆ is the
ˆ S(j)
(a) By the definition of mutual information, which is assumed to exist. Note that J,
decoder output which is determined by H1 , · · · , HMJ , Y.
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(b) Conditioning reduces entropy.
(c) Rewriting mutual information into entropy, and adding an X term where the inequality follows
because conditioning reduces entropy. Assuming all terms exist.
(d) Given X, Y is independent of the remaining terms.
(e) Only T(j) may contain information about S(j).
(f) From the system requirement that I(S(j); T(j)) ≤ δ.
Because H(j, S(j)) = log MJ MS = n(RJ + T2 ), along with equations (3.47) and (3.48), we have

R J + T2 ≤

1
1
1
( I(X; Y) + δ + ).
1−δ n
n

(3.49)

When n gets large and δ gets to zero, we have

R J + T2 ≤

3.2.3

1
I(X; Y).
n

(3.50)

Concepts of Linear Code Designs for Identification and
Secret Binding

We describe two linear coding approaches. The two approaches utilize the same encoding strategy;
the difference lies in the decoding capacity requirements. The approach which achieves the optimal
trade-off bound between identification and secret capacity would require a decoding method with
higher computational complexity. The other approach requires less decoding capacity so that more
practical decoders may be used for this system design, but it leads to a suboptimal trade-off.
To design a system preventing information about the secret from leaking through the helper data,
the idea is to use the biometric template signal as a surrogate noise in a additive channel between the
secret and the helper data, while the channel capacity should be zero. The idea is shown in Figure
3.5. Consider the secret and the helper data as two sequences of the same length. The secret is the
channel input and the helper data is the channel output while the channel is the encoding function f
whose noise is characterized by the biometric template. The best channel in this security context has
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Figure 3.5: Biometric templates are used as worst case noise of an additive channel to eliminate
mutual information between the secrets and the helper data.
the mutual information between the input and output is zero. One such channel is a channel of i.i.d.
uniform additive noise. Thus to achieve small leakage, one should map the biometric templates
to i.i.d. uniform sequences with a function f ′ , and add the result to the input secret sequences.
Mapping a typical sequence of a random process is analogous to optimal lossless source coding [94].
To identify individuals and estimate the secret, the system utilizes the correlation between the
correct template and the query, and the performance can be proved through standard joint-typicality
arguments and union bounds.

3.2.4

Encoding and Decoding

Based on the design concept described above, the encoding consists of two steps:
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• Map each secret s(j) onto sequences taking values over mathcalX. Since this does not change
the properties of the problem, the notation s(j) is kept to represent the resulting secret sequences.
• For each x(j), the helper data is computed as t(j) = Gx(j) + s(j), where G is a

nH(X)
log |X |

by n

generator matrix with certain requirements described later and H(X) is the entropy rate of
pnx .

There are two decoding approaches proposed in this section.

• Optimal trade-off achieving approach: the decoder checks if there exists a helper data t(ĵ) and
ˆ ∈ S such that from t(ĵ) − s(j),
ˆ the reconstructed template x̂ is jointly typical
a sequence s(j)

ˆ If there are
with the input query y . The decoder then outputs the satisfying t(ĵ) and s(j).
multiple candidates, the decoder picks one randomly.

• Suboptinal trade-off with lower decoder computational complexity: the decoder takes the query
ˆ and sequence ẑ that is a typical
y and checks if there exists a helper data tĵ , a sequence s(j)

ˆ The decoder outputs the corresponding ĵ
sequence of PZn and satisfies Gẑ = Gy − tĵ − s(j).

ˆ If there are multiple candidates, the decoder picks one randomly.
and s(j).

We assume that the source has higher entropy rate than the noise that H(X) ≥ H(Z). The conditions
for the matrix G, or an ensemble of generating G, to achieve the optimal trade-off or near optimal
trade-off with lower decoder complexity are

(1) it achieves near optimal lossless source coding of source X, and
(2.a) most typical sequences x can be recovered from Gx.
(2.b) most typical sequences z can be recovered from Gz.

The first condition is needed to ensure that there is only a negligible amount of information leaked
from t about s, i.e. I(T; S) approaches zero as n gets large. The first condition is required by both
approaches. Condition (2.a) is only required by the optimal trade-off approach where the decoded
ˆ has to be computed and checked for joint typicality with the query y. Condition (2.b) is only
x(j)
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needed for the near optimal trade-off with lower computational demand, where computing the noise
vector z is needed.

3.2.5

Secrecy Leakage Analysis

We have to check that T leaks negligible information about S, and conditions when the probability
of identification and secret estimation error approaches zero. For both approaches, the secrecy
leakage analysis is the same. We show the achievable region and error analyses of both approaches
separately.
By condition (1) of the previous subsection, each sequence of the set
o
n
GX = w : w = Gx, ∀x ∈ TPn(X) .

(3.51)

is nearly drawn from the i.i.d. uniform distribution over X . This is because each typical sequence is
almost equally likely and there are around 2nH(X) typical sequences, which is the number of possible
outcomes of G. Thus we have

H(S|T)

=
(a)

=

(b)

≥

H(S|GX + S)
H(S) + H(GX) − H(S + GX)
H(S) − nδ

where (a) is because S and GX are independent, and (b) is because GX is almost i.i.d. uniform
over X . Hence we have

1
n I(S; T)

≤ δ. This means that the helper data leaks a negligible amount of

information about the secret.

3.2.6

Achievable Region of the Optimal Trade-off Approach

The system error comes from the following two conditions:
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ˆ there does not exist a reconstructed
• For the correct individual j with all possible choices of s(j),
sequence x̂(j) which is jointly typical with the query y.
• There is another combination of individual l and secret s ∈ S such that the reconstructed x̂(l)
is jointly typical with the input query y.

The first type of error is bounded by the probability of the following events:




n
n
,
+ P Gx ∈
/ D| (x(j), y) ∈ Tp(X,Y)
P (x(j), y) ∈
/ Tp(X,Y)

(3.52)

where D ⊆ GX is the set of decodable sequences by the decoding algorithm. The first term approaches zero as n gets large. The second is negligible because the decoder is good, so condition
(2.a) described in subsection 3.2.4 is satisfied.
The second type error e2 is that there exists another tl̂ with a secret s ∈ S so that x̂ = φ(t̂(j), sk )
is jointly typical with the query y, where φ(·, ·) is the decoding algorithm. We have:
P (e2 )

(a)

≤

(b)

=

X



n
P (φ(t̂(l), s), y) ∈ Tp(X,Y)

X



n
P (x′ , y) ∈ Tp(X,Y)

X

2−I(X;Y)+nδ

(l,s)6=(j,s(j))

(l,s)6=(j,s(j))
(c)

=

(l,s)6=(j,s(j))

=

1

2−n( n I(X;Y)−RJ −T2 )−δ ,

where x′ is a sequence with distribution p(X) but independent of y, and

(a) the union bound is applied;
(b) follows from condition (1) in subsecition 3.2.4 and each typical sequence is almost equally
likely;
(c) is due to the fact that if x′ has the same distribution as the marginal of x but independent of
y, the probability that x′ and y is jointly typical is 2−I(X;Y) .
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Thus the second type of error goes to zero as long as RJ + T2 <

1
n I(X, Y)

and we obtain Theorem

2 which matches the converse result.

3.2.7

Achievable Region of the Suboptimal Approach with Lower Decoder Complexity

The probability of error comes from

• For the correct individual j, the decoder can not find a ẑ which is a typical sequence of PZn
ˆ
and satisfies Gẑ = Gy − t(ĵ) − s(j).

• There is another combination of individual and secret such that there exists a ẑ which is a
typical sequence of PZn and satisfies Gẑ = Gy − t(ˆl) − ŝ.
The first type of error happens when the noise z is not typical or Gz is not decodable when z is
typical, and both cases have negligible probability as the decoder is assumed to be good for pnZ . The
second condition happens if there exists a false pair of identity and secret so that Gy − t(l) − s is the
syndrome of a typical sequence of pnZ . There are nH(Z) out of nH(X) syndromes of G that contain
one and only one typical sequence of pnZ when the source code is good for pnZ . Since h(j) and sk
are i.i.d. uniform over X , the probability of each pair of (l, s) resulting in a syndrome of a typical
sequence of pnZ has probability 2n(H(Z)−H(X)) . The union bound of the second type of error e2 is

P (e2 )

≤

X

2−n(H(X)−H(Z))

(l,s)6=(j,s(j))

(a)

=

(MS MJ − 1)2−n(H(X)−H(Z))

≤

2−n((H(X)−H(Z)−RJ −T2 ) ,

which goes to zero when RJ + T2 < H(X) − H(Z|X). This proves Theorem 3.
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3.2.8

Conclusions

We proposed two system designs using linear codes for identification and secret binding trade-off.
One of the designs is proved to achieve the optimal trade-off for general source and noise distributions.
This design may require higher decoder complexity, while some practical applications may require
low computational complexity. Thus we also proposed a second system design which uses decoders
with lower complexity and prove its performance for general sources with additive noise. Also we
generalize previous achievable rate region results to general source and noise distributions. A future
direction is to design systems which consider information about the templates leaked from helper
data, and its trade-off with identification and secret capacity.
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Chapter 4

Robust Informative Feature
Selection for LDV and ECG
Biometrics
Laser Doppler Vibrometry (LDV) measures vibrations on the surface using the Doppler shift. LDV
signals are recorded in a non-contact fashion and the unobtrusiveness is a major benefit of this
technique as a biometric. LDV is targeted at the skin above the carotid artery due to arterial wall
movements associated with heartbeat. In contrast to the electrocardiogram (ECG), which measures
electrical activity of the heart through electrodes directly attached to the skin, the LDV signal is
derived from mechanical movements. Both signals have been proposed for biometric applications
[12, 13, 14, 9, 37, 46].
The LDV and ECG pulse signals provide information of the coarse aspects of the cardiac signal,
including heart rate and heart rate variability, as well as more fine-grained and advanced features
reflecting extremely detailed aspects of cardiovascular system. The LDV and ECG signals are nearly
impossible to mimic. In addition, liveness and stress information provided by both signals are also
useful against forgery.
Both the LDV and ECG signals of the same individual change from one occasion to the next, affected
by factors such as physical exercise, mental stress, and perhaps other unobservable states. Indeed,
several identification protocols based on the LDV signal produce a low equal error rate (EER) in
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the range of 0.5% to 3% if training and testing data are recorded consecutively on the same day,
but performance degrades to 19% or worse if testing data is collected one week to six months after
the training session [13]. One reason for this performance degradation is that the physiological
properties of the individual change gradually, and that these changes become more appreciable as
time between the training and testing sessions become large. Similar performance degradation has
also been observed in ECG biometrics, as discussed later in section 4.6. One way to overcome
this issue is to use training data collected from multiple sessions such that gradual change can be
modeled; however, this approach may not always be practical in actual use as the cost for repeated
controlled measures is high and is intrusive to the users’ activities. Methods that require only a few
sessions to achieve proper performance are needed.
We propose a new robust feature selection method that takes into account effects of changes in
statistics from training data to testing data for LDV and ECG biometrics. The idea is to jointly
consider how well a feature distinguishes an individual from others and how stable this feature
is. The idea of robust feature selection has evolved from an information-theoretic approach for
dimensionality reduction [71] and its applications [13], as well as literatures on feature selection
and sample size effects on recognition system performance [63, 31]. Extended from classical works,
the proposed approach attempts to encompass scenarios where probability densities of some features
vary from session to session gradually. When two training sessions are available, this method reduces
EER to single digits with testing data collected in a period as short as 4 s. When 12 s are available
for collecting testing data, EER can be further reduced to 7.4%. The EER is reduced by at most
21% relative to no selection, and 57% relative to the best approach based on two training sessions
described in [12]. Further optimization on the feature extraction and selection methods leads to a
cross session performance level of 6.5% for LDV and ECG biometrics, which are the leading results
as of January 2012.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 introduces basic procedures for LDV
signal and ECG signal acquisition and preprocessing, training and testing data set, and experimental
conditions. Section 4.2 provides an example of using a single training session. Section 4.3 describes
the concepts of robust feature selection, and the implementation of a robust feature selection algorithm for the LDV based biometric system. Section 4.4 summarizes simulation results of the LDV
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signal. The robust feature selection method for LDV biometric is concluded with discussion in 4.5.
Section 4.6 presents a comparative study of methods in ECG biometrics.

4.1

Laser Doppler Vibrometry Signal Acquisition and
Preprocessing

LDV data were obtained from 191 individuals who were asked to sit quietly for 5 min on three separate occasions. A Polytec PSV400 Laser Doppler Vibrometer, positioned at a distance of 91 cm from
the recording location, was targeted at a site overlying the carotid artery, at a level approximately
1 to 2 cm below the right carotid sinus. Photographic records were obtained to ensure cross-session
targeting constancy. For this study, target locations were marked with a small patch of retroreflective tape, and we have since confirmed that comparable data can be obtained from untreated skin.
In the later comparison study, ECG data was obtained from 285 individuals, including the previous
191 individuals.
Recorded signals are sampled at 10 kHz and digitized with a Biopac MP 150 recording system. Signals are processed to suppress speckle dropout artifacts, and segments of signals related to individual
heartbeats are extracted and downsampled to 1 kHz. Extracted carotid pulse signals are set to 700
ms in duration with the major velocity peak of each carotid pulse signal aligned at 200 ms. Figure 1
shows LDV pulse signal signals from two different individuals from two sessions. LDV pulse signals
from the same individual have the same color, with solid line and dash line indicating different
sessions. Wave form differences between individuals can be seen as well as differences between pulse
signals from the same individual but different sessions. The pulse signals are normalized so that
each has zero mean and unit energy.
The training data set consists of LDV signals from 191 individuals from two recording sessions,
separated by at least one week up to a month. In each session, there are 150 LDV pulse signals, each
corresponding to a single heartbeat, for each individual. A length 1102 feature vector is obtained
from each LDV pulse signal by a prolate spheroidal based time-frequency decomposition method
described later in this section. Hence, for each of the 191 individuals, the training data set consists
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Figure 4.1: LDV carotid pulse signals from two individuals from two sessions.
of 150 length 1102 vectors corresponding to 150 LDV pulse signals from each of the two sessions.
The testing data set consists of LDV signals from the same 191 individuals from a third recording
session, separated by one week to six months from either of the two training sessions. We use up
to 150 LDV pulse signals for each individual. Feature vectors are by the same method used in the
training data.
Each LDV pulse signal abbreviated to 688 ms is parsed into 38 short time fragments, 96 ms each
with 80 ms of overlap between consecutive short time fragments. We downsampled the LDV signals
to 1000 Hz so that each small time fragment is a length 96 vector. The short time fragments are then
projected onto a 29 dimensional space whose bases are discrete time prolate spheroidal functions
with complex coefficients. In our simulations, discrete time prolate spheroidal basis functions are
singular vectors associated with the largest 29 singular values of a matrix W whose (u, v) element is
Wu,v = e−jπ

(u−1)(v−1)
L

,

u ∈ 1, · · · , U ; v ∈ 1, · · · , V ,
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(4.1)

where U = 96 is the length of each small time fragment, V = 29 is total number of prolate spheroidal
basis functions, and L selected to be 2U . The log of magnitudes of coefficients are taken such that
each LDV pulse signal is represented as a length 1102 real number feature vector.
In practice, there may be constraints on data acquisition such that only a few heartbeats are available from a given individual as training data, or from an actual identity verification opportunity.
Biometric performance under time constraints are studied by using subsets of the training and testing data sets. We simulated training data constraints of 6, 12, 37, and 150 consecutive heartbeats,
and testing data constraints of 1, 4, 16, and 150 consecutive heartbeats. Overlapping sequences of
heartbeats are used for both training and testing. Assuming an average heart rate of 75 beats per
minute, this corresponds to 5, 10, 30, and 120 s for training and 1, 4, 12, and 120 s for testing.
Actual acquisition times depended on each individual’s heart rate.

4.2

LDV Biometrics Based on Single Training Session

We here illustrate the challenge of cross-session authentication in LDV and ECG biometrics and
the key observations. A scenario of training on one session and testing on another is presented for
the LDV biometrics. Authentication performance of a normal model is used [14]. This method
yields the best performance up to December 2007, prior to the robust feature selection method
was developed [12]. In this model, each feature (bin) of a individual is assumed to have the same
variance as a nominal model. The empirical mean for each feature is obtained using maximum
likelihood estimation. For the ith individual, the mean of the kth feature is calculated as mk,i =
P150
1
n=1 xn,k,i , where xn,k,i denotes the k-th feature of the n-th training LDV pulse of the i150

th individual. The nominal, population, mean and variance are calculated for the kth feature as
P191
P191
1
1
2
2
mk,0 = 191
i=1 mk,i , σk,0 = 191
i=1 (mk,i − mk,0 ) . The decision-making is based on the plug-in

hypothesis test and the null-hypothesis is chosen to be the nominal mean feature vector. During
testing, the testing pulse signal is decomposed into a feature vector x̄ with the same method as
training. The log-likelihood ratio becomes normalized mean square error, which is calculated as

Si =

1102
X
k=1

"

2

2

− (x̄k − mk,i ) + (x̄k − mk,0 )
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Figure 4.2: FMR and FNMR of training on session 1 and testing on sessions 1, 2 with normal model
using a single heartbeat.
The thresholding dimensionality reduction method can increase recognition performance by selecting
features which have distances to the nominal model greater than a threshold κ > 0 [71]. The distance
is calculated with a thresholding function d(·, ·). The nominal model is used as the null hypothesis,
which represents the population distribution. The selection criterion is to keep a feature for a
particular individual only if the relative entropy, i.e. the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, between
the individual model and the nominal model is greater than a threshold. For Gaussian distributions
2
,
with equal variances, the thresholding function becomes d(p0 , pi ) = D(p0 ||pi ) = (mk,0 − mk,i )2 /σk,0

for the kth feature. Using the selected features, a distinct model for each individual is created. The
modified log-likelihood ratio is calculated as

Si =

1102
X
k=1

"

2

2

− (x̄k − mk,i ) + (x̄k − mk,0 )

#

Id(p0k ,pik )>κ .

(4.3)

Figure 4.2 shows the performance of the log-normal model using a single testing heartbeat training
on single session. The EER is 2.6% for the within session test, 14.4% for inter-session testing with
all bins selected. Results indicate that for a threshold that leads to the selection of 71% of the bins
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on average, the EER for inter-session testing is reduced to 14.1%, and 12.5% using 4 heartbeats.
This represents a marginal improvement over the case when all the bins are used. Note that the
false non-match rate (FNMR) is very consistant across experimental settings, and what drives the
overall performance down is the drastic increase in false reject rate (FRR). This indicates that the
instability, or varibility, of the statistics of the LDV features of the same individual across different
sessions is the primary source of error and a key challenge in developing the LDV biometrics. Similar
perfromance degredation is also observed in ECG biometrics in cross session studies.

4.3

Robust Feature Selection against State Uncertainty

The results in Figure 4.2 can be improved if an approach is developed to account better for the
instability of the statistics of the features within an individual across sessions. In this section, we
present the concept of robustness in feature selection for LDV signal. A computational method
for quantifying robustness and realizing this robust feature selection concept for LDV and ECG as
biometrics is described. We evaluate this approach under several training and testing time constraints
in terms of number of heartbeats available on LDV biometrics.

4.3.1

Motivation and Concepts

Assuming that we have data from two sessions with a given individual, the goal of robust feature
selection is to choose features that provide more information to distinguish an individual from others
against the uncertainty caused by variation of the features. Note that this does not mean that the
features selected need to have both high distinguishability and stability. Consider six hypothetical
examples of a two dimensional feature of data collected from two individuals in two sessions shown
in Figure 4.3 to illustrate varying degrees of distinguishability and stability. The data points in the
same color are from the same individual.

(a) In this best case scenario, the feature provides both high distinguishability and stability. The
data points from two sources separated apart and form a single cluster for each source. Features
of this type are very rare in LDV and ECG biometrics.
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of features with different degrees of distinguishability and stability.
(b) This feature provides high distinguishability, but has lower stability. The data points from
different sources are still separated widely, but for a given individual, the data from different
sessions appear to form two clusters. However, by considering the empirical centers of two data
sources, marked as yellow and purple dots in the figure, and drawing two circles at the centers
that enclose the two means of data of different sessions, if the mean of each source in a testing
session lies within the circle, two sources can still be distinguished by using this feature. This
is a situation in which distinguishability is “stronger than” instability. By adjusting the radii
of the circles, one can have a more restricted or loosened selection criterion.
(c) This feature is stable, but provides slightly less distinguishability. A quantitative selection rule
can be developed by choosing a distinguishability measure and adjusting a threshold.
(d) The data points form four clusters, each corresponding to a source at a session, in a feature
with high empirical distinguishability but notably low stability. This is an important example
since if possible variations of states that govern data statistics are ignored, an overtrained
classifier can be found by finding a decision boundary that separates data from different sources.
However, physiological states are usually continuous and observed data from different states of
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a single source should look connected. In this case, consider the purple and yellow lines that
join two means of data from the same source but different sessions. Data from the two sources
in a third session may have means anywhere alone these lines, resulting in highly overlapped
data clusters. As argued in (b), the distinguishability of this feature is diminished by its acute
instability.
(e) The distinguishability is already weak in this case, so that when taking its low stability into
account, the usefulness of this feature is diminished.
(f) This is a clear case of a useless feature that while stable, exhibits no distinguishability.

In summary, when selecting features with slowly varying states that remain nearly constant within
a session but change across sessions, neither distinguishability nor stability alone can be used to
determine the biometric utility of a feature, as illustrated in cases (e) and (f) respectively. However,
as illustrated in cases (b) and (c), distinguishability and stability must be considered jointly.

4.3.2

Computational Aspects of Robust Feature Selection

The algorithm consists of three steps: (1) learning how data are distributed across sessions and
individuals, (2) quantifying distinguishability and instability of each feature for each individual, and
then (3) selecting robust features. For identity verification, the binary hypothesis testing problem
is to decide if the incoming LDV pulse signal is from the claimed identity j, or from others, i.e.
the general population. Thus the goal of robust feature selection is to select features that can
consistently provide information to distinguish a given individual from the population.
Given an individual, the steps can be computationally realized as shown in Figure 4.4 and the
following.

(1) For the i-th feature, probability densities for each session denoted as f1,i and f2,i are learnt.
Also each feature at each session has a nominal model representing the population density,
denoted as f1,p and f2,p . Moreover, the densities of fusing data from two sessions is denoted
as f12,i and f12,p as the two centers in Figure 4.3.2. The fusion densities can be learnt from
averaging the resulting density, or direct estimation from two session data. The probability
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Figure 4.4: Accessing distinguishability and instablility for robustness. The green line represents the
distinguishability of the feature between the individual model f12,i and the population model f12,p .
The red balls represents the instability of the features, whose radii are proportional to the difference
between densities of two sessions f1,i and f2,i . The red overlap region is inversely propotional to the
robustness of the feature.
densities can be assumed from a parametric family of distributions and can be learnt from
parameter estimation. Also nonparametric density estimates can also be used that are more
robust to model assumptions [76].
(2) The distinguishability of a feature can be measured by how different the fusion densities f12,i
and f12,p are. The difference measure d(·, ·) can be a metric such as the L1 norm, or a distortion
measure where symmetry is not required, such as the relative entropy, i.e. Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence. The instablility, on the other hand, can be measured by the difference of two
densities between the same individual across sessions [23]. We denote distinguishability and
instablility as D(i) and I(i) respectively.
(3) Distinguishability and instablility can then be used to determine the robustness of a feature.
For example, if both are quantified by the same difference measure, a simple rule as D(i)−cI(i)
can be used, where c is a constant. This is shown in Figure 4.3.2 that the blue radii represent
the instability of the feature weighted by constant c, the green line is the distinguishability,
and the red circles are the uncertainty balls whose overlap region is inversely proportional to
the robustness of this feature.
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4.3.3

A Robust Feature Selection Algorithm

The features we obtained represent 1102 coefficients resulting from the prolate spheroidal based timefrequency decomposition. The data distribution is estimated through nonparametric kernel density
estimation. N denotes the number of the LDV pulse signals available in each training session under
various time constraints. Also, xs,n,k,i denotes the value of the kth time frequency component of
the nth LDV pulse signal from individual i from session s. For each feature of each individual, we
obtain an empirical probability density estimate for each of the two sessions by using Gaussian kernel
density estimation[76] with N training values. The densities are denoted as f1,k,i (x) for session 1,
and f2,k,i (x) for session 2, where k is the index of the time frequency components ranging from 1 to
1102, and i is the index of the individual ranging from 1 to 191, such that
−

fs,k,i (x) = N

N
X
e
−1
n=1

(x−xs,n,k,i )2
σ2
s,k,i

√

, s ∈ {1, 2}

2πσs,k,i
1

σs,k,i = 0.9σ̂s,k,i N − 5 ,

(4.4)

(4.5)

where σ̂ is the standard deviation of training data xs,n,k,i , n ∈ {i, · · · , N }. The mixture density,
fm,k,i , is computed as
fm,k,i (x) = (2N )−1

X

N
X

s=1,2 n=1

−

e

(x−xs,n,k,i )2
σ2
m,k,i

√

2πσm,k,i

,

1

σm,k,i = 0.9σ̂m,k,i (2N )− 5 ,

(4.6)

(4.7)

where σ̂ is the standard deviation of training data xs,n,k,i , s = 1, 2; n ∈ {i, · · · , N }, and m indicates
that it is a mixture density of the two sessions. Also, for each feature, we use 191k LDV pulse signals
to obtain a population density of the feature for each session. The densities are denoted as f1,k,p
for session 1, and f2,k,p for session 2, where p indicates population densities. Also, overall mixture
densities, fm,k,p , are computed as
−

(x−xs,n,k,i )2

N
191 X
σ2
X
s,k,p
e
−1
√
, s ∈ {1, 2}
fs,k,p (x) = (191N )
2πσs,k,p
i=1 n=1
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(4.8)

−

fm,k,p (x) = (382N )−1

N
191 X
X X
e

s=1,2 i=1 n=1

(x−xs,n,k,i )2
σ2
m,k,p

√

2πσm,k,p

,

1

σs,k,p = 0.9σ̂s,k,p (191N )− 5 ,
1

σm,k,p = 0.9σ̂m,k,p (382N )− 5 ,

(4.9)

(4.10)
(4.11)

where σ̂s,k,p is the standard deviation of kth value of all LDV pulse signals from all individuals from
the s session, and σ̂m,k,p is the standard deviation of the kth time frequency component of all LDV
pulse signals from all individuals from both sessions. Hence, each individual has a total of 3306
densities for 1102 features from two sessions and one mixture, and so does the population.
The stability and distinguishability of a feature of an individual can be quantified by comparing the
densities of the individual and densities of the population across different sessions. As discussed in
part 4.3.1, the instability of a feature reflects differences in the data from the same individual or
the population across multiple sessions. Hence, the instability can be quantified by the L1 distance
between f1,k,i and f2,k,i

I(k, i) =

X Z

∞

−∞

s=1,2

|fm,k,i (x) − fs,k,i (x)| dx,

(4.12)

|fm,k,p (x) − fs,k,p (x)| dx.

(4.13)

and the L1 distance between f1,k,p and f2,k,p

I(k, p) =

X Z

s=1,2

∞

−∞

Here, I(k, i) denotes the instability of feature k of individual i, and I(k, p) denotes the instability of
the densities of feature k of the population. Similarly, the distinguishability can be quantified as

d(k, i) =

Z

∞

−∞

|fm,k,i (x) − fm,k,p (x)| dx,

(4.14)

which measures the distance between the densities of the kth time frequency component of two
sources, the individual i and the population.
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For each individual i and each feature k, we compute objective scores

o(k, i, t) = d(k, i) − t(I(k, i) + I(k, p)),

(4.15)

where t is an adjustable parameter from 0 to 2. Then o(k, i, s) is compared with zero and if
o(k, i, s) > 0, feature k is selected for individual i. Thus, higher values of parameter t require greater
levels of distinguishability versus instability for a given feature to be included into the biometric
discrimination model. The set of selected feature indices for individual i is denoted as Fi .

4.3.4

Identity Verification

In the testing phase, extracted LDV pulse signals are decomposed though the same prolate spheroidal
time frequency decomposition used in the training phase, denoted as x̄. For the claimed identity
ī ∈ {1, · · · , 191}, we extract the feature indexes selected for individual ī and their associated mixture
densities, and also the population mixture densities of those features. For each testing LDV pulse
signal at each selected feature, optimal binary hypothesis testing is performed using trained mixture
densities; the score of a selected feature is 0 if the feature rejects claimed identity, and 1 if the feature
accepts the claimed identity:


score(x̄, ī, k) = µ fm,k,ī (x̄k ) − fm,k,p (x̄k ) , k ∈ Fī ,

(4.16)

where µ is the unit step function. The score of a testing LDV pulse signal is computed through
normalized voting so that it is between 0 and 1:
score(x̄, ī) = |Fī |−1

X

score(x̄, ī, k).

(4.17)

k∈Fī

Then the score is compared to a threshold for the final decision if it is tested based on a single
heartbeat, i.e. under 1 s testing data acquisition time constraint. For 4 and 16 heartbeats based
verification, the simple sum rule is used to fuse consecutive individual LDV pulse signal scores, and
then compare to a threshold for decision.
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Figure 4.5: ROC curves for training on 37 heartbeats and testing on 1, 4, 16, and 150 heartbeats with
feature selection. Dots mark the EER: 11%, 8.3%, 7.6%, and 7.0% for 1, 4, 16 and 150 heartbeats.

4.4

LDV Biometrics Results

Identity verification performance in terms of equal error rate (EER) is summarized in Table 1, under
16 training and testing constraints with or without the robust feature selection described in Section
4.3. The relative EER reduction by feature selection is shown in the last four columns of Table
1. The top row indicates training time allowed for collecting LDV signals, with units in s (and
the associated number of heartbeats available). The first column indicates the testing time allowed
and associated number of heartbeats available. Figure 3 shows the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curves based on training on 37 heartbeats and testing on 1, 4, 16, and 150 heartbeats.
The “with feature selection” columns of Table 1 show the 16 EERs that are the best results of
different feature selection thresholds t, simulated as described in (4.15). The “without feature
selection” columns are EERs obtained without feature selection. It is clear that with the robust
feature selection, as long as 4 or more heartbeats are available, the EER is under 10% (even for a
training condition which allows for only 5 s to extract 6 heartbeats for each individual). The last
four columns indicate the EER reduction gained by feature selection relative to systems without
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feature selection under different training and testing conditions. For example, when training with
30 s and testing with 12 s of LDV data, EER is reduced from 8.8% (without feature selection) to
7.6% (with feature selection), such that a

8.6−7.6
8.8

= 11% relative reduction of EER is obtained.

The relative reduction from training on two sessions with robust feature selection over training on
a single session described in section 4.2 is 37%.

4.5

Conclusion of LDV Biometrics

We are able to obtain EER performance of less than 10% under various time constrained scenarios
using a robust LDV method which emphasizes the analysis of variations of feature statistics among
training and testing sessions. Robustness is achieved through jointly considering distinguishability
and stability of features across sessions. The results support the utility of LDV measurements as
a novel source of biometric information. Further optimization on the feature generation, i.e. the
decomposition, methods and quantitative measures of robustness lead to a cross session performance
level of 6.5% by Ikenna Odinaka.
Theoretical foundations for the proposed robust feature selection coupled with proposed feature
fusion need to be further studied, as do other distance measures and feature fusion methods. The
chosen L1 distance measure between probability distributions is closely related to the Bayes risk
of binary hypothesis test and the Kolmogorov variational distance [23]. For any two probability
densities h(x) and g(x) over support X , we have
Z
=

Zx∈X

|g(x) − h(x)|dx

x∈X ,g>h

=



2 1−

Z

g(x) − h(x)dx +

Z

x∈X ,h>g



min (g(x), h(x)) dx ,

x∈X

h(x) − g(x)dx
(4.18)

where the integral of last equality of (4.18) is equal to the probability of error. Thus, voting through
features selected by using the L1 distance to measure distinguishability with a threshold q means
that with k test data sets, the distributions of vote counts of data drawn from h(x) and g(x) should
be distinguished at least as well as distinguishing a binomial with parameter q from a binomial
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Table 4.1: EER (%) under 12 training and testing time constraints(s) and associated number of heartbeats (hb) available with or without
robust feature selection, and relative EER reduction. Two significent digits are reported.
With feature selection
Without feature selection
Relative EER reduction
Training (s/hb)
Training (s/hb)
Training (s/hb)
Testing (s/hb) 5/6 10/12 30/37 120/150 5/6 10/12 30/37 120/150 5/6 10/12 30/37 120/150
1/1
12
12
11
11
13
13
12
11
7.7
7.7
8.3
0.0
4/4
9.7
9.4
8.3
8.2
10
11
9.3
8.8
3.0
15
11
6.8
12/16
9.1
8.3
7.6
7.4
9.5
10
8.8
7.8
4.2
17
14
5.1
120/150
8.6
7.7
7.0
7.0
10
9.8
8.6
7.9
14
21
19
13

with parameter 1 − q, under the assumption of features being independent. Besides the congruence
with the L1 distance measure, another possible benefit of using voting for feature fusion lies in its
robustness against outliers among selected features, such as few dominant likelihood ratios from
some features toward the wrong decision. When relative entropy is used as a distortion measure
between densities with the sum of loglikelihood ratios of features as the score, the EER performance
degraded to above 10%.

4.6

Comparative Study of Methods in ECG Biometrics

As the robust feature method yield good results in LDV biometrics, two questions need to be
addressed:

• How well is the performance of the robust feature selection method compare to other methods?
• How do the robust feature methods perform on related biometrics where instability due to
state changes also plays an important role?

Both questions are studied by applying the proposed robust methods to electrocardiogram (ECG)
based biometrics. The use of ECG as a biometric is an emerging field started from the studies
by Biel et al. in 1999 [9], and Irvine et al. [37] and Kyoso and Uchiyama in 2001 [46]. Until
May 2012, there have been over 100 publications on methods for ECG biometrics. This provides a
great opportunity to compare the performance of different methods. Special thanks to our colleague
Ikenna Odinaka who implemented a large number of methods in the literature, optimized the robust
feature method specific for ECG, and carried out a comprehensive study. Note that methods based
on fiducial features were not implemented and not included in the comparison due to following four
reasons [38]:

• No consensus on standards for detection of characteristic points.
• Location of some characteristic points are disproportionately affected by the presence of noise,
even using a fixed fiducial detector.
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• Difficulty in defining the boundaries and peaks of atypical heartbeats usually leads to an
increased failure to enroll.
• Problems with generalizability to larger databases, when the number of features are limited.

4.6.1

A Robust Feature Selection Method for ECG Biometrics

From each ECG pulse signal, we compute a spectrogram which is the logarithm of the square of the
magnitude of the short-time Fourier transform of a normalized ECG heart pulse. In computing the
short-time Fourier transform (STFT), we use a Hamming window of size 64ms, with a step size, which
is defined as the distance between the beginnings of two consecutive windows of 10ms. Thus, there
is an overlap of size 54ms between consecutive time frames. This window size was chosen empirically
so that it yields robust and good single-heartbeat authentication performance in terms of equal error
rate (EER). After computing the STFT, the frequency content was truncated at 250Hz to reduce
boundary effects. The spectrogram is then computed as the logarithm of the squared-magnitude of
the truncated STFT. We refer to the index of each point of the spectrogram as a time-frequency bin.
Thus each ECG heart pulse can be represented by L = 2048 time-frequency components denoted as
Y (l). To build a generative classifier, we use independent normal distributions to model the timefrequency bins of each subject. During training, only the means and variances have to be estimated.
For each bin l of subject i, we use the maximum likelihood (ML) estimates which are the sample
means and variances denoted as θ̂i (l) = (µil , σil2 ).
We use a robust informative feature selection method to select informative time-frequency bins
for verification and recognition for ECG. This method is very similar to the one used for LDV
biometrics. The two key elements considered in our feature selection method are distinguishability
and stability. The feature should help distinguish the subject from a reasonably large subset of other
subjects, and it should be stable across sessions. The l-th feature of the i-th subject is selected if the
symmetric relative entropy, i.e. the symmetric Kullback-Leibler divergence, between N (µil , σil2 ) and
2
the nominal distribution N (µ0l , σ0l
) is larger than a threshold κ > 0. The relative entropy between

two densities p and q is defined by
D(pkq) =

Z
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p log

p
q

(4.19)

where the integral is taken over the support set of p. The symmetric relative entropy between the
two densities is defined as
d(p, q) = D(pkq) + D(qkp)

(4.20)

For the Gaussian distributions used in our model, the symmetric relative entropy between N (µil , σil2 )
2
and N (µ0l , σ0l
) is
2
σ 2 + (µil − µ0l )2
σ0l
+ (µil − µ0l )2
d(θˆi (l), θˆ0 (l)) = il
+
−1
2
2σ0l
2σil2

(4.21)

where the nominal model is obtained by using the spectrograms of all the subjects in the database.
Using the symmetric relative entropy for feature selection ensures that only those bins whose distributions are far from the nominal are selected for each subject, thereby ensuring distinguishability.
Moreover, stability of features is enforced by the variance of the subject’s bin σil2 . It follows from
2
the construction of the nominal model that for the most part, σil2 < σ0l
, so that the second term in

equation (4.21), with σil2 in the denominator, increases as σil2 decreases; for subject bins with small
variances, the symmetric relative entropy tends to be large.
The score of a test heartbeat using the i-th subject’s model is given by the log-likelihood ratio (LLR):

Λi =

L
X
l=1

#
pi (Y (l)|θˆi (l))
Id(θˆi (l),θˆ0 (l))>κ
log
p0 (Y (l)|θˆ0 (l))
"

(4.22)

where I{·} is the truth function indicating which time-frequency bins are selected; l is the index of
the bins. For verification, the LLR given in equation (4.22) is compared with a threshold τ , so that
if Λi > τ , the heartbeat with the claimed identity is accepted, otherwise the heartbeat is rejected.
For recognition, the LLR is computed for every subject model, and the subject whose model gives
the largest score is declared. For rank-k recognition, subjects with models yielding the top k scores
are declared. For across session verification, the score function was modified so as to disregard the
role of the variances of the time-frequency bins. That is, we set θˆi (l) and θˆ0 (l) to a constant θ.
In recognition, to ensure that a variable number of time-frequency bins can be selected for each
subject’s model, the score obtained from comparing a test heartbeat to a subject’s model is normalized by a score obtained from comparing the heartbeat to the nominal model. This normalization
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ensures that there is no direct relationship between the number of bins used in a subject’s model,
and the value of the computed score [71]; more selected bins does not mean higher scores.

4.6.2

Comparative Results

The within-session analysis results are given in Table 4.2, which shows each algorithm, the authentication performance reported in the cited paper, if available, and its performance using our database.
In the table, FS and NFS stand for “feature selection” and “no feature selection” respectively [59];
FS and NFS correspond to the cases where relative entropy based feature selection is or is not used,
respectively. Moreover, “train 8, test 8” represents using 8 heartbeats, or 8 s, for the cases of Agrafioti et al. and Wang et al.. for training and the same number for testing. From the table, we can
see that most algorithms do a decent job in modelling the ties within an individual and discriminating between individuals. However, for some algorithms there are noticeable differences between
the authentication performance reported in the literature and what we obtained using our database.
The original algorithm proposed by Molina et al. [57] uses a morphological baseline wander removal
technique during preprocessing, which introduces distortions in the ECG recording; When bandpass filtering was used for preprocessing instead, the authentication performance improved. Also,
the polynomial-based algorithm proposed by Sufi et al. [79, 78] suffers from performance deficiencies
compared to what was reported in the literature. This is likely due to the large sample size we used
for this study; only 15 individuals were used in the original study performed by the authors. When
the first 15 individuals from our database were used for the biometric study, an equal error rate of
0.95% was obtained. The same phenomenon holds true for the algorithm proposed by Coutinho et
al. [19, 18]. The original study performed by the authors used ECG data obtained from 26 individuals. When the first 26 individuals from our database were used for the biometric study, an equal
error rate of 0% was obtained, in comparison to the much higher rates, in the range of 35% observed
when applied to our full database of 265 individuals. The algorithm proposed by Yao and Wan [92]
doesn’t perform as well as some of the other methodologies. One possible reason for this is that only
a single principal component was used for classification. The principal component approach may
not be adequate to completely separate overlapping classes in the feature space. In general, when
training and testing data come from the same session, most algorithms are good at accepting a true
identity and rejecting a false one, as evidenced by their within-session authentication performance.
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However, when training and testing are on different days, all the algorithms suffer a deterioration
in performance, as is reflected in Table 4.3. In the table, “train 32, test 16” represents using 32
heartbeats (or 32 s) from session 1 for training and using 16 heartbeats (or 16 s) from session 3 for
testing.
The results for across-session testing, when the training data are obtained from two different days
is given in Table 4.4. In the table, “train (8+8), test 16” represents using 8 heartbeats (or 8 s) each
from sessions 1 and 2 for training and using 16 heartbeats (or 16 s) from session 3 for testing. Crosssession training is vital to the improvement of biometric performance as it accomodates variability
across different measurement times in the model.
Based on the across-session performance when fusion is used, we can see that a few of the methodologies provide the framework to capture the variability across time and provide for an improvement
in authentication performance. By comparing the last columns in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, where a
total of 32 heartbeats (or 32 s) are used for training, and 16 heartbeats (or 16 s) are used for testing,
we can see the effect of fusing data from more than one session during training, on the authentication
performance; With the exception of the algorithm by Fang and Chan [26], all the algorithms show
a varied degree of improvement in performance, which can be attributed to data fusion. The most
remarkable improvement in performance can be seen in the algorithm by Odinaka et al. [59] and
Wan and Yao [84], where data fusion accounts for about a 50% and 65% drop in EER, respectively.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the detection error tradeoff curves for the top three (based on EERs)
methodologies in the within-session and across-session (with fusion) analysis, respectively. In the
figures, the red, blue, and green lines represent the detection error tradeoff curves for the first,
second, and third methods (in terms of EER), respectively.
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Figure 4.6: Detection error tradeoff (DET) curve for the top three methodologies in the withinsession analysis

Figure 4.7: Detection error tradeoff (DET) curve for the top three methodologies in the across-session
(with fusion) analysis
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Table 4.2: Authentication performance for within-session analysis
Equal Error Rates (%)
Researchers
Literature Train 8, Test 8 Train 16, Test 16 Train 32, Test 32
Agrafioti et al. [2]
0.6
3.88
0.85
0.57
Chan et al. [11]
5.82
3.84
3.02
Chiu et al. [15]
0.83 - 0.86
4.15
2.64
1.76
Coutinho et al. [18]
42.54
38.92
35.14
Fang and Chan (SC) [26]
19.81
19.1
19.03
Fatemian and Hatzinakos [27]
8.69
5.99
4.37
Irvine et al. [38]
2.25
1.74
1.26
Khalil and Sufi [44]
5.28
2.64
1.56
Li and Narayanan (HPE+SVM) [52]
0.55
2.19
1.24
1.17
Lourenço et al. [54]
13
12.01
9.3
6.56
Molina et al. [57]
2
19.99
16.31
16.27
Molina(M) [57]
13.71
7.53
6.16
Odinaka et al. (FS) [59]
0.02
1.89
0.93
0.38
Odinaka et al. (NFS)[59]
1.93
1.04
0.51
Sufi et al. [79, 78]
27.39
21.97
17.14
Wan and Yao et al. [84]
7.98
2.15
0.75
Wang et al. (DCT) [85]
3.9
2.22
1.74
Wübbeler et al. [90]
1.08
0.57
0.57
Yao and Wan [92]
24.46
22.32
20.63
Ye et al. [93]
5.11
2.84
1.64

Train 64, Test 64
0.38
2.26
1.01
33.34
18.82
2.26
0.69
1.13
0.96
5.25
15.98
5.57
0.03
0.06
13.42
0.27
1.36
0.38
18.49
1.13
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Table 4.3: Authentication performance for across-session (without fusion) analysis
Equal Error Rates (%)
Researchers
Train 8, Test 8 Train 16, Test 16 Train 16, Test 32 Train 32, Test 16
Agrafioti et al. [2]
17.95
11.73
11.64
10.48
Chan et al. [11]
16.83
15.37
14.99
14.91
Chiu et al. [15]
26.56
26.28
26.20
26.38
Coutinho et al. [18]
47.14
45.77
44.67
44.59
Fang and Chan [26]
29.53
29.54
29.59
29.57
Fatemian and Hatzinakos [27]
20.40
20.30
20.18
19.42
Irvine et al. [38]
22.25
21.93
21.87
21.66
Khalil and Sufi [44]
24.16
22.89
22.13
21.94
Li and Narayanan (HPE+SVM) [52]
19.94
19.20
19.16
18.33
Lourenço et al. [54]
26.11
25.29
25.33
24.85
Molina et al. [57]
37.07
31.75
30.77
30.20
Molina(M) [57]
34.61
28.65
27.13
25.92
Odinaka et al. (FS) [59]
12.30
11.29
11.13
11.11
Odinaka et al. (NFS)[59]
21.46
20.66
20.37
19.80
Sufi et al. [79, 78]
35.34
33.17
31.98
32.23
Wan and Yao [84]
16.93
18.44
16.82
21.65
Wang et al. (DCT) [85]
17.94
17.69
17.63
17.72
Wübbeler et al. [90]
16
15.6
15.79
15.59
Yao and Wan [92]
33.33
31.79
31.38
30.92
Ye et al. [93]
22.98
19.19
20.17
20.17

Train 32, Test 32
10.36
14.64
26.36
43.93
29.71
19.31
21.57
21.13
18.16
24.58
29.42
24.67
11.30
20
31.64
19.22
17.61
15.77
30.13
18.55
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Table 4.4: Authentication performance for across-session (with fusion) analysis
Equal Error Rates (%)
Researchers
Train(8+8), Test 8 Train(8+8), Test 16 Train(16+16), Test 16
Agrafioti et al. [2]
10.68
10.53
9.56
Chan et al. [11]
12.30
11.91
11.57
Chiu et al. [15]
21.34
21.18
21
Coutinho et al. [18]
46.17
45.64
44.41
Fang and Chan [26]
30.18
29.85
30.22
Fatemian and Hatzinakos [27]
17.13
16.66
16.92
Irvine et al. [38]
19.65
19.43
19.35
Khalil and Sufi [44]
18.91
18.58
18.87
Li and Narayanan (HPE+SVM) [52]
17.40
17.38
17.06
Lourenço et al. [54]
23.22
22.48
22.46
Molina et al. [57]
27.62
27.21
26.12
Molina(M) [57]
22.24
21.46
20.89
Odinaka et al. (FS) [59]
6.12
6.04
5.64
Odinaka et al. (NFS)[59]
16.08
15.85
14.91
Sufi et al. [79, 78]
33.49
31.03
31.35
Wan and Yao [84]
9.31
9.45
6.23
Wang et al. (DCT) [85]
16.16
15.92
15.85
Wübbeler et al. [90]
14.62
14.29
14.11
Yao and Wan [92]
30.99
30.69
30.15
Ye et al. [93]
16.74
17.06
14.32

Train(16+16), Test 32
9.51
11.22
20.97
43.77
30.18
16.35
19.22
18.53
17.09
21.97
26.19
20.48
5.47
14.73
29.95
6.28
15.93
13.98
29.84
13.67

Chapter 5

The Minimum Description Length
Principle for Clustering and
Computational Stemmatology

5.1

Introduction

Clustering is one of the fundamental problems in learning, and is important in many fields from
artificial intelligence to bioinformatics. A fundamental problem in clustering is the existence of free
parameters affecting the outcome. Many clustering algorithms require users to determine either
explicitly the number of clusters to output, such as the Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), K-means,
and nonlinear manifold learning [77], or implicitly, such as hierarchical clustering methods [91],
graph clustering by graphical cuts [82] and affinity propagation (AP) [29]. Despite allowing those
algorithms to be flexible, it imposes difficulties in comparing and interpreting results. Can the
number of clusters and other parameters be determined in a principled way? Can a clustering
algorithm balance the number of parameters used and the modeling error? These are classic model
selection questions addressed in information theory and other communities for a long time [66, 6,
74, 83]. Model selection theories have been applied to cluster multinomial data based on MDL
arguments [45], GMM clustering [10] based on the universal prior of integers developed by Rissanen
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[64], and K-means clustering [61] based on the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) developed by
Schwarz [74].
In real life, one often encounters a very closely related situation where one needs to infer a structural
relationship among data points based on an incomplete dataset. Stemmatology is a class of such
problems. The goal of stemmatology is to reconstruct a family tree of different variants of a text
resulting from imperfect copying, which is a crucial part of textual criticism. In reality, historians often have incomplete data because some variants are not yet discovered and there are missing
portions in available variants due to physical damage. Stemmatology is similar to molecular phylogenetics where biologists aim to reconstruct the evolutionary history of species based on genetic or
protein sequences. Adoption of phylogenetics methods has lead to encouraging results in automatic
stemmatology.
In this chapter, we propose an information-theoretic framework of similarity-based clustering based
on the idea of two, or multi, part codes and MDL, and its application to stemmatology. We utilize
MDL concepts to the structural inference problem, particularly focusing on stemmatology where in
addition to missing data points, the available data points have missing values. We offer new insights
on how to handle these issues. Description length is measured information theoretically with the bit
as the fundamental unit that the number of clusters can be determined automatically and balanced
with the algorithm performance. We argue that similarity-based clustering problems can be turned
into problems of combinatorial optimization on graphs and there is an information theoretic rationale
of graph-based clustering methods. We develop a general algorithm based on MDL insights that is
simple to implement and can be used along with other existing algorithms, and propose a generic
MDL encoder with minimal assumptions made about the data, returning a hierarchical clustering
of data. We discuss and demonstrate the potential application of the proposed MDL clustering
concepts to stemmatology. Our method is applied to realistic datasets and outperforms major
existing methods as of June 2010.
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5.2

MDL Clustering Code Intuition

In this section, we introduce two intuitive MDL settings for clustering. The first is to partition the
data into clusters only. The second is to determine clusters and for each cluster, to determine an
exemplar. For both cases, the following notation is used. The number of data points is denoted as
N . The data points are denoted as xi ∈ X ⊂ Rd , where i = 1, · · · , N . Let x denote (x1 , · · · , xN ) and
x ∈ X = X N . The number of clusters inferred is denoted as K. For the case in which exemplars
need to be identified, the exemplars are denoted as xk , k ∈ K,where K ⊂ {1, · · · , N } is the index
set of exemplars with cardinality K. For the case in which only clusters need to be determined,
k = 1, · · · , K denotes a generic index of clusters.
When only clusters need to be determined, a code which describes a particular choice of clusters
consists of three parts:

1. To specify K requires log N bits;
2. To specify a cluster k requires log K bits for each data point;
3. To describe Xl given that it is in cluster k requires log

1
P (xl |k)

bits.

The total description length is then

log N + N log K +

X

k=1,···,K




X

l∈L(k)


1
,
log
P (xl |k)

(5.1)

where L(k) is the index set of data points in cluster k.
For the case where clusters and their exemplars need to be determined, a code which describes a
particular choice of clusters and exemplars consists of four parts:

1. To specify K requires log N bits;
N
2. To specify indexes of exemplars requires log CK
bits;

3. To specify an exemplar xk , k ∈ K requires log
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1
P (xk )

bits;

4. To specify the exemplars for all other data points requires less then (N − K) log K bits;
5. To describe xl given that its exemplar is xk requires log

1
P (xl |xk )

bits.

The total description length is then

log N

+
+

N
log CK
+ (N − K)logK


X
X
1
log 1 +
,
log
P (xk )
P (xl |xk )

k∈K

(5.2)

l∈L(k)

where L(k) is the index set of data points with exemplar xk .

5.3

MDL for Similarity Based Clustering

It is readily seen that MDL provides a basis for clustering from choosing the number of clusters to
assign cluster membership to each data points. In addition, MDL-based model selection allows one
to easily incorporate prior information or constraints into models by translating them into densities
or encoding strategies of model parameters. We consider the MDL setting for similarity-based
clustering in this section. We assume that xi are independent for all i. An other major category of
clusterings is density based clustering whose brief overview is given in section 5.10.
For similarity-based clustering, one has to estimate the description length through similarities for
selecting clustering models. There are three ways to encode a data point, either to encode it directly,
to jointly encode it with some other data, or to encode it provided other encoded data. It is clear
that there are different perspectives of how similarity-based clustering can be done under different
restrictions of encoding operations, resulting in different two part codes and interpretation. For
example, if one allows all joint encoding among any number of data points in the same cluster, it is
well known that encoding all data jointly leads to the shortest code length. Hence in this framework,
the shortest encoding is the grouping of all data in the same cluster and to jointly encode them,
leading to no clustering. Thus one should restrict the encoding parameters so that a clustering
interpretation exists. One obvious restriction is to allow joint encoding among at most ν < N data
points. Since most similarity measures used in practice are defined on pairs of data, we shall consider
90

the case of encoding a data point using at most one other data point, along with model parameters.
This leads to following two clustering frameworks, both of which can be turned into optimization
on graphs.
1st order similarity-based clustering with weak exemplars: The goal is to minimize the code length
of describing data x with model parameter vector t whose ith element is an integer from {1, · · · , N },
the helper data index of the ith data point. The code length is

L(x|t) + L(t) =

X

xi :i6=ti

L(xi |xsi ) +

X

L(xi ) + L(t).

(5.3)

xi :i=ti

If no prior is assumed for t, the second term is at most N log N . When ti = i, xi has to be encoded by
and
itself and the code length is L(xi ). When ti 6= i, the code length is L(xi |xti ). Letting tqi = ttq−1
i
N +1
must hold. This means that if we
t1i = ti , we see that for all data points to be encodable, tN
i = ti

take data points as N vertexes s on a graph and connect an edge between vertexes (i, ti ), ∀i 6= ti , we
have a forest. By adding an additional base vertex and connecting it to all vertexes with i = ti , we
then have a tree clustering. Thus finding the shortest code length for similarity-based clustering can
be turned into a problem of finding an minimum path length arborescence tree (MAT) in a complete
directed graph. The weights of directed edges are L(xi |xti ), and vertexes are data points and the
base node. The resulting directed tree has the base vertex as its root, and the number of children
of the root is the number of clusters. Data points with a common ancestors up to the children of
the root are clustered to be in the same cluster. The resulting tree can be viewed as a hierarchical
clustering with exemplars at each branch. If the corresponding similarity measure used is symmetric,
it is then the well known problem of finding the minimum spanning tree (MST). Tarjan’s algorithm
is proved to find the MAT in a directed graph with no negative cycle with complexity O(N 2 ) [73].
1st order similarity-based clustering with strong exemplars: In this framework, ti is allowed only if
t2i = ti except for the exemplar data which has i = ti , the other data can only be coded with an
exemplar data as helper data. As discussed earlier, this is then a problem of finding a two level
arborescence tree in a complete directed graph.
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5.4

Simulations on Syntheses Data

We present simulations using MDL-based MST clustering. The code lengths L(xi ) and L(xi |xj )
are measured as the sum of the lengths of Rissanen’s universal code for integers [64] of data vector
elements, or differences of data elements, are quantized to a desired precision. Case 1 consists of
four 2-dimensional Gaussian clusters with means forming a square with edge length equal to 30.
The covariance matrices are all equal to the identity matrix. In Case 4, two Gaussian clusters with
means 45 units apart are simulated. The covariance matrices are I and 5I. In Case 3, data vectors
are drawn uniformly from four rings of outer radius 1.1 and inner radius 0.9 with centers forming a
square with edge length of 10. In Case 4, data vectors are drawn from two interlocking rings in 3
dimensional space shown in Figure 3. Both circles have radius 2, centered at the origin and (2, 0, 0),
and lie on the x − y plane and the y − z plane respectively. For all cases, each cluster has 100 data
points.
The results are shown in Figures 1 to 4. The MDL-MST returns the correct number of clusters for
these three cases. Case 3 shows that MDL-MST clustering can resolve clusters of a complicated data
structure, while affinity propagation (AP) returns a larger number of clusters. Affinity propagation
often returns more clusters than the actual number, even when parameters are set to the suggested
values of [29].

5.5

Introduction to Computational Stemmatology

Before printing technology was widespread, text documents had to be copied by hand, mostly with
errors. Thus, despite many documents originating from a common original text, they differ from one
another. For those variants that survived and were discovered, historians are interested in knowing
the relations among them, in particular, the family tree of the copying history. The research of
finding such a family tree based on surviving variants is called stemmatology, and a proposed tree
is called a stemma. A stemma is ideally a rooted tree where a child node is copied from its ancestor
node in the tree. An accurate stemma with geographical, and temporal if available, information of
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Figure 5.1: Results of Case 1 using MDL-MST returning 4 clusters (left) and AP returning 12
clusters (right).
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Figure 5.2: Results of Case 2 using MDL-MST returning 2 clusters (left) and AP returning 11
clusters (right).
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variants, may provide important historical evidence related to the spread and interaction of variants
with local cultures.
There are a number of mechanisms which lead to differences in variants. During the Middle Ages,
Latin was no longer an actively spoken or written language. However, many texts were still copied
in Latin; the copyists might understand a part of the text. This results in a large amount of
unintentional copying error as well as intentional changes. Also for an original text being copied for
centuries, the errors accumulate from one copy to another. These have resulted in large differences
among surviving variants. Also, to construct a stemma, a number of variants must be considered
simultaneously. The number of possible stemmata grows enormously with the number of variants:
for example, there are 1.4 × 109 stemmata for 30 variants [28]. Hence, beyond traditional manual
approaches, computer aided stemmatology methods are needed.
One can quickly notice that the problem of stemmatology is closely related to phylogenetics. The
copying process with error is similar to genetic mutations during the evolution process. Also in both
cases, there are missing variants. In biology, there may be no genetic data from extinct species. For
both cases, variants whose word orders or genetic sequences are similar to each other are considered to
be close in the resulting tree. Many automatic stemmatology methods are inspired by phylogenetic
methods, and have been improved since the work of Robinson and O’Hara [68]. These methods
have produced encouraging results as they have been applied and evaluated on small datasets where
historians have strong confidence in historical relation among variants. For these datasets, there is
a consensus stemma based on many forms of evidence.
Despite those successful automatic stemmatology results, several challenges remain. In particular,
early test datasets are relatively small and ideal in that there are few missing variants, and most
available variants have few missing portions. However as mentioned before, it is known that historical
variants have missing portions due to physical damage. This poses additional challenges compared
to phylogenetics, where in most cases, full gene or protein sequences are available. On the other
hand, it is reasonable for phylogenetics to construct a bifurcation tree with all variants as leaves since
there rarely is an occasion where more than two species mutated and evolved from an ancestor at
exactly the same time, and the surviving species should indeed be the result of the latest mutations.
This is not the case in stemmatology, where several copyists can copy from an identical source and
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surviving variants need not be the latest copies. Other issues such as contamination where a variant
is copied based on two or more sources are also unique in stemmatology. In the review by Roos and
Heikkilä [70], 13 major algorithms are evaluated on three artificially generated datasets with known
true stemmata. The datasets are generated by subjects copying texts but not real historical data.
Notably one of them, the Heinrichi dataset, is a much more realistic dataset where nearly half of
the variants are missing, and available variants have large missing portions. Even though the best
performing method on the Heinrichi dataset obtains good accuracy slightly lower than results from
simpler datasets, surprising failures of several promising methods, such as CompLearn [17], indicate
that more should be done to address the issue of incomplete data [56].

5.6

Computational Challenges and Datasets

Inferring structure among data points in the presence of missing data is tied closely to a set of
graphical optimization problems collectively called the Steiner Tree problem. In the Steiner tree
problem, a graph G = (V, E) and a subset S of V are given. The goal is to find a tree G′ that connects
all nodes in S and minimizes the total edge weights in G′ . In stemmatology and phylogenetics, S is
then the set of variants or genetic sequences of interests, and V is then the set of all possible variants
or genetic sequences that are relevant to the problem at hand. The edge weight is a distance or
similarity measure we pick. In general, the Steiner tree problem is N P hard, and it is even N P to
have a close approximation. Under the case with missing portions in available variants, in the worst
cases, even the optimal imputation and structural inference among only the available variants is a
Steiner Tree problem.
Rather than adopting to our problem a general algorithm for the Steiner tree problem, we develop a
novel approach based on the specific properties of the datasets in stemmatology. Our goal is to learn
what concepts should yield algorithms that perform well. The current best performing algorithm
RHM developed by Roos, et at., is in fact closely related to a Steiner tree algorithm. We give an
MDL interpretation of why RHM succeeds.
The Heinrichi dataset and the Parzival dataset are used to evaluate algorithm performances in the
Computer-Assisted Stemmatology Challenge [70]. The Heinrichi dataset consists of an original text,
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a 17th century late medieval Finnish folktale Piispa Henrikin Surmavirsi, written in old Finnish.
17 copyists participated to produce 67 text variants with contamination. The copyists are mostly
Finnish but can only understand some ancient words, which resembles the situation in real stemmatology problems. In simulation, large portions of available variants are deleted on purpose, and only
37 variants are available. Thus it is similar to real world stemmatology with the physical damage
and variants uncovered. Each variant has around 1200 words with an average of 300 missing words.
Heinrichi is currently the most realistic data set with a large amount of incomplete data.
On the other hand, the Parzival [70] dataset is smaller consisting of 21 variants of the German poem
Parzival by Matthew Spencer and Heather F. Windram. Only 5 out of the 21 variant are missing
to the algorithm and no missing portions except those generated by copying error. This dataset is
mostly for validation that any algorithm should produce reasonable performance on it, and it is easy
to analyze results on this dataset.

5.7

Notations

A variant of a text is denoted as xj = (xj1 , · · · , xjn ), where j is the variant index, n is the supposed
number of words in a variant, and xji , i = 1, · · · , n is a word or ‘?’ if the word is missing at a location.
The set of all variants of interest is denoted S. The number of variants of interest is denoted N .
Here it is assumed that the variants are aligned. For this purpose, multiple aligmment techniques
exist similar to the well known Needleman-Wunsh algorithm. While alignment is indeed a relevant
issue, it is not the focus of this paper, and aligned data are used in simulations. A stemmatology
structure, called the stemma, of a set of variants is a connected graph of nodes V and edges E such
that xj ∈ V for all j. Note that V may contain auxiliary nodes depending on what algorithms are
being used, and the graph need not be a tree as one person may produce a variant by referring
to multiple sources, known as contamination in the stemmatology literature. The set of all words
appearing in the set of variants is denoted X , and the total number of elements in X is m.
In order to compare structural differences between two stemmatology graphs, the average sign similarity is introduced [70]. For a given undirected graph G, the simple path length between two nodes
A and B is defined as the number of edges along the shortest path between A and B defined on
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G. The simple path distance between two nodes on the true graph is denoted as d(A, B), and the
distance between them on the inferred graph is denoted as d′ (A, B). For any three nodes A, B, and
C, the sign agreement index is defined as
1
u(B, C|A) = 1 − |sign(d(A, B) − d(A, C))
2
−sign(d′ (A, B) − d′ (A, C))|,

(5.4)

where | · | is the absolute value. This index measures if the proposed graph has the same ordering
of B and C, given a reference node A, as the true graph. It is equal to 1 if the order is the same in
the truth and the proposed graph, 1/2 if one and only one of them is zero, i.e. B and C have the
same distance from A, and 0 if the ordering is mismatched. The average sign similarity between
two stemmatology graphs G and H given a set of variants xj is defined as

D(G, H) =

X

xi 6=xj 6=xk

u(xj , xk |xi )/6.

(5.5)

Note that the division by 6 is to discount equivalents due to permutation. Given a true structure
T , the score of an inferred structure G is defined as D(G, T )/D(T, T ).

5.8

MDL Concepts for Stemmatology

The stemmatology problem can be approached using MDL and information theoretic ideas as in
[70, 51, 17]. We start with assuming no missing data and no missing word in any variant to illustrate
the key idea. The MDL concept to be presented has to be generalized for datasets with missing
words and missing variants, which will be discussed in the following two subsections. In general,
given an encoding function (Z), which may be a general purpose compression algorithm or model,
we denote Z(xi ) as the number of bits to encode xi by itself, and Z(xi |xj ) as the number of bits to
encode xj given xi . As mentioned in [51], finding a efficient encoding of all variants is equivalent to
finding the minimum spanning tree of a fully connected undirected graph with variants as its nodes
and pairwise code length as the length of its edges. Besides using a compression algorithm, one can
also use a generic code with the indexed bag of words X . To describe a variant, without any other
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information, it takes n log m bits where m = |X |. Furthermore, it takes



n


log N + log n + log 
 + k log m
k

(5.6)

bits to describe the variant xi based on the variant xj if they differ in k words. The first log N
bitsare used
 to describe the index j, log n bits are used to describe the number of differences, and
 n 
log 
 bits are used to describe the locations of differences. In this encoding scheme, all variants
k
have the same code length when coding by itself, and the code length from xi to xj is the same as
xj to xi .

5.8.1

MDL Concepts for Missing Words

When there are words missing in some or even all variants, there are problems in determining the
code length between two variants. Two rough approaches are to either encode locations with words
missing, denoted as ’ ?’, as an additional symbol added to X , or simply consider available words only
and using some model or compression algorithm such as gzip for encoding. Both approaches have
the same major drawback in cases where two variants have large number of locations with words
missing. Suppose two variants xi and xj both have n 14 words missing but at different locations,
while the overlapping part of available words are identical. This high word missing rate is common
in stemmatology datasets. On the other hand, direct encoding also exaggerates the difference that
encoding the words of a child in locations where words are missing in the parent requires a large
number of bits as if those words are directly encoded by themselves. This also suggests a reason
why the normalized compression distance (NCD) based CompLearn does not work well in one of the
testing datasets, the Heinrichi dataset, with high word missing rate [70]. The NCD is defined by

eZ (A, B) =

Z(A, B) − min{Z(A), Z(B)}
,
max{Z(A), Z(B)}

(5.7)

where Z measures the number of bits required using a compression algorithm. For the example
case under discussion, the NCD between those two variants will roughly be

1
3.

In general, when

two variants have a large number of non-overlapping locations with words missing, the NCD would
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be overly large. It is because Z(A, B) takes roughly the number of bits to encode overlapping
available words plus non-overlapping words, and Z(A) takes roughly the number of bits to code
overlapping available words plus words in A but missing in B. Assume without loss of generality
that Z(A) > Z(B), Z(A, B) − Z(B) is then roughly the code length for words in A at locations that
words are missing in B which is approximately the number of such locations times the entropy of
words. After divided by Z(A), the resulting NCD is largely biased by missing parts mismatch, which
is mainly a result of physical degradation of text variants not the copying process. The negative
effects of missing words and needs of specific approaches to deal with missing words for NCD are
also discussed in detail in [56].
Under the MDL concept, the key is to encode data efficiently. Thus for locations with words missing,
one should either not encode the words or encode them in a way that leads to efficient encoding of
other variants. In fact, if missing words in xi are available in xj , one can have xi filled in under a
low bit cost. To do so, one first copies xi as xi and encodes only the difference between xi and xj
whenever the words are available in xj . Clearly due to this encoding strategy, the actual number of
bits to encode xi given xj further depends on the parent of xj . For example shown in 5.5, encoding
xj given A or B requires the same number of bits. However, choosing B as the parent of xj leads
to a shorter total description length using the described encoding method. Likewise, if one fixes
the parent variant, what to fill in depends on its children. Thus searching the shortest code length
becomes a problem of simultaneously finding the optimal tree structure as well as optimal words to
fill in locations with words missing for all variants that are not leaves of the resulting tree. This
problem is related to the well-known Steiner tree problem, which is know to be N P-hard.

Figure 5.5: The total code length depends on what are filled in locations with words missing, which
in turn depends on the tree structure.
As the difficulty of the Steiner tree problem lies in estimating the miss parts of the variants, one
can instead attempt to directly estimate the code length between two variants based only on the
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available parts. We can view that there exists a channel from one variant to the other with channel
capacity denoted as Ci|j . The code length from xj to xi is then n(1 − Ci|j ) when n is large. Thus
in analogy, given a compression algorithm Z, we can estimate the Z(xi |xj ) as

n
ni,j Z(x̂i |x̂j ),

where

ˆ· denotes the overlapping available part, and ni,j is the length of the overlapping available part.
This assumes that the statistical property of the differences of available words are asymptotically
the same as the channel. This is a reasonable model for typos but not for insertion and deletion.
Since we are considering the parts available in both variants and the variants are aligned, the effects
of insertion or deflection may be suppressed. We can also use (5.6) by substituting n with ni,j and
k with k̂ which is the number of differences in the overlapping part.

5.8.2

MDL Concepts for Missing Variants

In real stemmatology or phylogenies problems, it is known that not all variants are available in the
dataset. As mentioned earlier, there is a strong emphasis on learning the correct structural relation
among variants in stemmatology problems. Hence it is reasonable to ask, if it would lead to a more
efficient code when one adds auxiliary variants in the inferred tree. It may be a surprise that the
answer is indeed yes, and also adding auxiliary variants help infer the stemma better. For any three
nodes A, B, C where A is the parent, if there exists a D ∈ X n that
Z(D|A) + Z(B|D) + Z(C|D) < Z(B|A) + Z(C|A),

(5.8)

then adding D as an auxiliary node leads to a more efficient encoding. Likewise if D is an auxiliary
node, (5.8) can be used to decide if D should be removed. For example, using the encoding given
by (5.6) for A, B, and C, it is easy to show that when there is a large portion of locations where B
and C are the same but different from A, adding an auxiliary node D helps encoding. Such a node
D is constructed to coincide with B on those locations otherwise the same as A leads to a more
efficient encoding. Practically speaking, (5.8) can only be evaluated once the encoder Z and nodes
to be considered are known, but the main concept here is that conditions satisfying (5.8) exist, and
(5.8) can be used to add or delete auxiliary nodes in a principled way.
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Thus, when there are no missing words in any variant, finding the most efficient encoding of variants
of interest given Z while allowing adding auxiliary nodes is a case of Steiner tree problems. In a
Steiner tree problem, a graph G = (V, E) and a strict subset of nodes S ⊂ V are given. The goal is
to find a subgraph G′ of G with minimum total edge length such that G′ is connected and contains
all nodes in S. S can be viewed as the variants of interests. V can be viewed as the set of all the
length n sequence of words from X . The edges E are the code lengths defined by Z. A Steiner tree
problem is in general N P-complete. There exist a number of heuristic search and approximation
algorithms (see [34] for a classical review). The RHM algorithm described in [69] utilizes a similar
concept while forcing the stemma to be a bifurcating tree.

5.9

MDL for Computational Stemmatology Simulation Results and Conclusions

For a given encoding method Z and a set of variants of interest S, run the following algorithm:

for i 6= j do
L = {l : xil , xjl 6=?}, ni,j = |L|
x̂i ← concatenation of xil , l ∈ L
x̂j ← concatenation of xjl , l ∈ L
Ei,j =

n
ni,j Z(x̂i , x̂j )

end for
return G = MST(S, E)
This is closely related to the well-known Chou-Liu algorithm [16]. When Z is chosen
tothe generic

 ni,j 
MDL encoding whose code length is described as in (5.6), one can note that log 
 is approxki,j
k

) when ni,j is large, remembering ki,j is the number of differences between x̂i and
imately ni,j H( ni,j
i,j
k

k

x̂j . Also if ki,j is small relative to ni,j , H( ni,j
) can be approximate by a straight line c ni,j
where c
i,j
i,j
is a constant. This reduces the numerical problem for computing large combinatorial terms. Thus
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Table 5.1: Performance of 14 algorithms on the Heinrichi dataset and the Parzival dataset
Method
Heinrichi (%) Parzival (%)
MDL
79.0
78.5
76.0
79.9
RHM
Parsimony
74.4
77.8
Parsimony BS
73.6
85.4
64.4
81.5
Neighbor Joining
Neighbot Joining BS
62.9
87.1
64.2
81.5
Least squares
Least squares BS
62.6
79.8
64.4
79.3
n-Gram clustering
NeighborNet
59.1
77.8
53.1
74.5
SplitDecomp.
ParsimonySplits
56.8
83.7
CompLearn
52.7
81.5
51.4
72.6
Hierarchical clustering
(5.6) becomes
log N + log ni,j + ki,j (c + log m).

(5.9)

By keeping the leading term associated with ki,j of (5.9) and plugging into the computation of edge
length E we have
Ei,j =

ki,j
n(c + log m).
ni,j

(5.10)

Note that the minimum spanning tree is invariant to uniform scaling in the input edge lengths,
hence only the ratio between ki,j and ni,j is needed in this case. This results in a simple normalized
Hamming distance approximating the code length between pairs of variants.
Using the result in (5.9), we construct a stemmatology structure for both the Heinrichi and Parzival
dataset used in [70]. The resulting average sign similarity described in 5.5 for the Heinrichi dataset
is 79.0%, which is better then all 13 algorithms reviewed in [70]; only three of them achieve above
65%. The resulting tree is shown in Figure 3. For the Parzival dataset, the result is 78% which
is around the middle of the 13 algorithms with 6 of them above 80%. The results of the Parzival
dataset is shown in Figure 5.9, with the ground truth presented in Figure 5.8. Table 5.9 summerizes
our performance along with the 13 algorithms reviewed in [70].
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5.10

A Note on Density Based Clustering and MDL

In this section, we briefly review of MDL principle and the density based clustering. We start from
the stochastic complexity as the foundation of MDL, and then describe how to use MDL principle
in density based clustering. Stochastic complexity as described in [7] and [66] starts from classes of
models, or probability distributions

Mγ = {P (x|θ, γ) : θ ∈ Θγ } ,
and the union of model classes M =

S

γ∈Γ

(5.11)

Mγ . If γ is known, a naı̈ve guess for the shortest

description length is log P (x|θ̂, γ)−1 , where θ̂(x) is the maximum likelihood (ML) estimate of θ
given x. While the shortest length itself is computable, codes based on log P (x|θ̂, γ)−1 are not
decodable, since information about the ML estimate is not yet coded. One reasonable objective is
to have a code which minimizes the worst case redundancy over the optimal code if the ML estimate
was given. The length of such a minimum redundancy achieving code is defined as the stochastic
complexity of x relative to the model class Mγ .
This can be formulated as a problem of selecting a distribution Q(x) which is computable given x
and the model class Mγ , such that Q(x) minimizes the worse case code length redundancy over
shortest description length, which is

max log
x

P (x|θ̂(x), γ)
.
Q(x)

(5.12)

The optimal distribution found in [75] is
Q∗ = P

P (x|θ̂(x), γ)

x∈X

P (x|θ̂(x), γ)

,

(5.13)

which is called the normalized maximum likelihood (NML) distribution. The code length using
Q∗ (x) is
log

1
P (x|θ̂(x), γ)

+ log

X

P (x|θ̂(x), γ).

(5.14)

x∈X

The second part is due to the unknown parameters and is defined as the parametric complexity [7].
Note that it can be shown that two-part codes achieve the same code length asymptotically [66]. In
104

two part codes, the code length is

log

1
P (x|θ̂(x), γ)



+ L θ̂(x) ,

(5.15)

where L is the code length of its input variable. Under the conditions of [66], the Fisher information
matrix I(θ) of P (x|θ̂) given x exists and the parametric complexity asymptotically achieves
n
dθ
log
+ log
2
2π

Z

1

|I(θ)| 2 dθ + o(1)

(5.16)

as n gets large, where dθ is the dimension of θ.
Comments Computation of the stochastic complexity of some model class Mγ can be approached
from either the NML coding (5.14) or two part codes by checking the conditions of Rissanen [66].
The NML coding imposes less constraints, while two part codes are more intuitive and results derived
by Rissanen [66] largely reduce the computation cost. One should note that stochastic complexity
is a property of a model class. Only discrete data can possibly be encoded in finite length. If
x is continuous, one can discretized x to some precision δ to approximate the coding length. The
summation in the denominator of (5.13) is changed to an integral. If the integral exists, the stochastic
complexity is then (5.14) or (5.15) with an additional precision cost log δ.
The goal of density based clustering is to take x as input and output a cluster index vector cK whose
ith element is an integer in {1, · · · , K} as the cluster index for xi . We can rewrite θ in two parts
θ = (cK , θK,η ), where θk,η denotes the parameters of the density of the kth cluster.
Theorem 1 : For density based clustering, if conditions in Section II of [66] are satisfied, the stochastic
complexity of x to a model class γ = (K, η) is upper bounded by
X

log

1

P (xi |ĉi , θ̂ci ,η (x))


X
K
+ log
(K − j)N
(−1)j
K −j
j=0,···,K−1
Z
1
n
dθ
log
+ log |I(θ)| 2 dθ + o(1) + L(K, η),
+
2
2π
i=1,···,N
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where ĉi and θ̂ci ,η are ML estimates given x, and L(K, η) is the code length of the model class index,
which is log

1
PK,η (K,η)

if a prior is assumed, or log N |Γ| otherwise.

Proof: For two part codes, the code length is

log

1
P (x|ĉK , θ̂K,η (x))

+ L(ĉK , θ̂K,η (x)) + L(K, η),

(5.17)

From the independence assumption, the first part is then
X

log

X

log

i=1,···,N

=

i=1,···,N

1
P (xi |ĉK , θ̂K,η (x))
1

P (xi |ĉi , θ̂ci ,η (x))

,

(5.18)

where the last equality is to evaluate the code length of each xi using its cluster density. The second
part can be upper bounded by the length of encoding cK and θK,η independently. The code length
of cK is loosely upper bound by N log K. A tighter bound can be obtained by counting the number
of sequences the elements can take, and must include all integer values from 1 to K, which is
X

j=0,···,K−1

(−1)j




K
(K − j)N .
K −j

(5.19)

The worst case code length is the log of (5.19) if each sequence is assumed to be equally likely.
Given an assumed family of densities, the code length of θK,η can be computed using the Fisher
information matrix as shown in [66], which is equal to the parametric complexity expressed in (5.16).
L(K, η) is trivial. This complete the proof of theorem 1.
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Figure 5.6: The true stemma of the Heinrichi dataset. Filled dots represent missing variants. Nodes
with two parents are due to contamination.
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Figure 5.7: The resulting stemma generated from the minimum spanning tree based on the generic
MDL code. Note its similarity with the true stemma can be further noticed by focusing on the
neighborhood relation among available nodes (labeled with alphabets) which may be connected
through unavailable nodes. For example, in the true graph node B is in fact closely connected to A,
Cf, M, L, and K while equally far away from the group of Be, Bd, Bb and the group of C, Cd, E, as
the inferred stemma suggests.
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Figure 5.8: The true stemma of the Parzival dataset. The nodes labeled with pure numbers are
missing variants that are not available to the algorithm
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Figure 5.9: The inferred stemma of the Parzival dataset is the minimum spanning tree of a graph
with edge weight being the normalized Hamming distance. Note that in the true stemma, there
are five variants unavailable to the algorithm. This results in several errors in the sign similarity
measure. For example variant 8 is directly connect to variant 5 and variant 6 in the inferred stemma,
while there are actually two missing variants between variant 8 and 5. On the other hand, in the
true stemma if we view two variants connected though unavailable variants as directly connected,
the inferred structure is actually close to the true structure.
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[17] Rudi Cilibrasi and Paul M. B. Vitányi. Clustering by compression. IEEE Trans. Info. Theory,
51:1523–1524, 2005.
[18] David Pereira Coutinho, Ana L. N. Fred, and Mario A. T. Figueiredo. One-lead ecg-based
personal identification using ziv-merhav cross parsing. In Pattern Recognition (ICPR), 2010
20th International Conference on, pages 3858–3861, aug. 2010.
[19] David Pereira Coutinho, Ana L. N. Fred, and Mario A. T. Figueiredo. Personal identification
and authentication based on one-lead ecg using ziv-merhav cross parsing. In Proceedings of
the 10th International Workshop on Pattern Recognition in Information Systems (PRIS)’10,
Funchal, Portugal, pages 15–24, 2010.
[20] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas. Elements of Information Theory. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
New York, NY., 1991.
[21] Imre Csiszár. Linear codes for sources and source networks: Error exponents, universal coding.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 28(4):585–592, 1982.
[22] Imre Csiszár and János Körner. Information Theory. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[23] Luc Devroye, Laszlo Györfi, and Gabor Lugosi. A Probabilistic Theory of Pattern Recognition.
Springer, 1996.
[24] A. W. Eckford, F. R. Kschischang, and S. Pasupathy. Analysis of ldpc codes in channels with
memory. Proceedings of the 21st Queen’s Biennial Symposium on Communication, Ontario,
Canada, 2002.
[25] M. K. Reiter F. Monrose and S. Wetzel. Password hardening based on keystroke dynamics. In
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2001.
[26] Shih-Chin Fang and Hsiao-Lung Chan. Human identification by quantifying similarity and
dissimilarity in electrocardiogram phase space. Pattern Recogn., 42:1824–1831, 2009.
[27] S. Zahra Fatemian and Dimitrios Hatzinakos. A new ECG feature extractor for biometric
recognition. In The 16th International Conference on Digital Signal Processing, 2008.
[28] Joseph Felsenstein. Inferring Phylogenies. Sinauer Associates, Inc., 2004.
[29] Brendan J. Frey and Delbert Dueck. Clustering by passing messages between data points.
Science, 315:972–976, 2007.
[30] Nir Friedman. The Bayesian structural EM algorithm. In Proceedings of the 15th international
conference on Machine learning, 1998.
[31] Keinosuke Fukunaga and Raymond R. Hayes. Effects of sample size in classifier design. IEEE
Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Learning, 11(8):873–885, 1991.
[32] J. Garcia-Frias and W. Zhong. Approaching shannon performance by iterative decoding of linear
codes with low-density generator matrix. IEEE Communication Letters, 7:266–268, 2003.
[33] Peter D. Grünwald. The Minimum Description Length Principle. MIT press, 2007.
111

[34] Frank K. Hwang, Dana S. Richards, and Pawel Winter. The Steiner Tree Problem. North
Holland, 1992.
[35] Tanya Ignatenko and Frans M J Willems. Biometric systems: Privacy and secrecy aspects.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 4(1).
[36] Tanya Ignatenko and Frans M J Willems. Fundamental limits for biometric identification with
a database containing protected templates. In Proceeding of the international Symposium on
Information Theory and its Applications, Taiwan. 2010.
[37] J.M. Irvine, B.K. Wiederhold, L.W. Gavshon, S.A. Israel, S.B. McGehee, R. Meyer, and M.D.
Wiederhold. Heart rate variability: a new biometric for human identification. In International
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IC-AI’2001), Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, 2001.
[38] John M. Irvine, Steven A. Israel, W. Todd Scruggs, and William J. Worek. eigenPulse: Robust
human identification from cardiovascular function. Pattern Recognition, 41:3427–3435, 2008.
[39] Anil K Jain, Karthik Nandakumar, and Abhishek Nagar. Biometric template security.
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing, 2008:1–17, 2008.
[40] Anil K. Jain, Arun Ross, and Umut Uludag. Biometric template security: challenges and
solutions. In in Proceedings of the European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO 05),
Antalya, Turkey. 2005.
[41] A. Juels and M. Wattenberg. A fuzzy commitment scheme. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 28–36. 1999.
[42] A. Juels and M. Wattenberg. A fuzzy vault scheme. In Proceedings of the 2002 International
Symposium on Information Theory. 2002.
[43] Alan D. Kaplan, Joseph A. O’Sullivan, Erik J. Sirevaag, and John W. Rohrbaugh. Laser doppler
vibrometry measurements of the carotid pulse: biometrics using hidden markov models. In
Proceedings of SPIE, Orlando, Florida, USA. 2009.
[44] Ibrahim Khalil and Fahim Sufi. Legendre polynomials based biometric authentication using
QRS complex of ECG. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Intelligent Sensors,
Sensor Networks and Information Processing, 2008.
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[54] André Lourenço, Hugo Silva, and Ana Fred. Unveiling the biometric potential of finger-based
ecg signals. Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience, 2011(720971), 2011.
[55] Emin Martinian, Sergey Yekhanin, and Jonathan Yedidia. Secure biometrics via syndromes. In
Proceedings of the 2005 Allerton Conference. 2005.
[56] Toni Merivuori and Teemu Roos. Some observations on the applicability of normalized compression distance to stemmatology. In Proceedings of 2nd Workshop on Information Theoretic
Methods in Science and Engineering, 2009.
[57] Gary Garcia Molina, Fons Bruekers, Cristian Presura, Marijn Damstra, and Michiel van der
Veen. Morphological synthesis of ECG signals for person authentication. In European Signal
Processing Conference, Poznan, Poland, 2007.
[58] C. Nicola, F. Alajaji, and T. Linder. Decoding ldpc codes over binary channels with additive
markov noise. Proceedings of the 2005 Canadian Workshop on Information Theory, Montreal,
Canada, 2005.
[59] Ikenna Odinaka, Po-Hsiang Lai, Alan D. Kaplan, Joseph A. O’Sullivan, Eric J. Sirevaag, Sean D.
Kristjansson, and John W. Rohrbaugh. Ecg biometrics: A robust short-time frequency analysis.
In 2010 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS).
[60] Joseph A. O’Sullivan and Po-Hsiang Lai. Pattern recognition system design based on ldpc
matrices. In Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory,
pages 33–36. Adelaide, Australia, 2005.
[61] D. Pelleg and A. Moore. X-means: Extending k-means with efficient estimation of the number of
clusters. In Proceesings of the 17th international conference of machine learning, San Francisco,
USA, pages 727–734, 2000.
[62] Christain Rathgeb and Andreas Uhl. A survey on biometric cryptosystems and cancelable
biometrics. EURASIP journal on information security, 3, 2011.
[63] Saruans J. Raudys and Anil K. Jains. Small sample size effects in statistical pattern recognition: Recommendations for practitioners. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine
Learning, 13(3):252–264, 1991.
[64] J. Rissanen. A universal prior for integers and estimation by minimum description length.
Annals of Statistics, 11:417–431, 1983.
[65] J. Rissanen. Universal coding, information, prediction and estimation. IEEE Trans. Info.
Theory, 30:629–636, 1984.
113

[66] J. Rissanen. Fisher information and stochastic complexity. IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, 42:40–47,
1996.
[67] J. Rissanen. Information and Complexity in Statistical Modeling. Springer, 2007.
[68] Peter Robinson and Robert J. O’Hara. Report on the textual criticism challenge 1991. Bryn
Mawr Classical Review, 3(4):331–337, 1992.
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